Treatise on Atonement

Hosea Ballou - 1805

In this treatise on atonement, I shall confine myself to three general inquiries: first, of sin, second, of atonement, and third, of the consequences of atonement to mankind. These particulars may be represented by a disorder; the remedy for the disorder, and the health enjoyed in consequences of a cure.

And first, of sin, which for the sake of ease, I subdivided as follows: First, its nature, second, its cause, and third, its effects.

And first, of the nature of sin. Sin is the violation of a law which exist in the mind, which is based upon the imperfect knowledge men have of moral good. This law is transgressed, whenever, by the influence of temptation, a good understanding yields to a contrary choice. Where a law exist, it presupposes a legislature whose intentions, in legislation, must be thwarted, in order for the law to take cognizance of sin. This legislature, in all moral accountable beings, is a capacity to understand, and connect with the cause and means of knowledge, which standing, or existing, on finite and limited principles will justify my supposition, that sin, in its nature, ought to be considered finite and limited, rather than infinite and unlimited, as has, by many, been supposed.

By offering my reason against the infinity of sin, I shall open to an easy method of showing it to be finite. The supposition that sin is infinite, is supported, or rather pretended to be supported, on the consideration of its being committed against an infinite law, which is produced by an infinite legislature, who is God Himself. I have before observed, and I think justly, that the intentions of a legislature, in legislation, must be thwarted, in order for the law, to take cognizance of sin. Now if God, in a direct sense of speaking, be the legislature of the law which is thwarted by transgression, in the same direct sense of speaking, his intentions in legislation are thwarted. With eyes open, the reader cannot but see, that if sin be infinite because it is committed against an infinite law, whose author is God, the design of the Deity must be abortive; to suppose which, brings a cloud of darkness over the mind, as intense as the supposition is erroneous. It cannot, with any propriety be supposed that any rational being can have an intention contrary to the knowledge which he possesses. Was a resolve brought into the state legislature to be passed into an act, it would be very unlikely to succeed, providing the legislature knew that the intentions of the act would utterly fail. It is possible, and very frequently the case, that imperfect beings desire contrary to their knowledge; but this, in every instance, is proof and often the cause of their misery. In such cases misery rises to an exact proportion to the strength of the desire.

Now to reason justly, we must conclude, that if God possesses infinite wisdom he could never intend anything to take place or be, that will not take place or be, nor that which is or will be, not to be at the time when it is. And it must be considered erroneous to suppose that the All Wise ever desired any thing to take place, which by his prescience he knew would not. As such a supposition must, in effect, suppose a degree of misery in the Eternal One's mind equal to the strength of his fruitless desire. Was this the case, the misery which mortals are subjected, bears not the thousandth part of the proportion to the misery of the Divine Being, as the smallest imaginable atom does to the weight of the ponderous globe; providing, at the same time, the idea of infinity is attached to Deity! Again, if we admit of a disappointment to the Supreme Being, even in the smallest matter, it would follow, that we have no satisfactory evidence whereby to prove that anything at present, in the whole universe, is as he intended. All the harmonies of nature, which to the eye of wondering man, are so convincing of the existence of that power, wisdom and goodness, which we adore, may have continued their laws in active force much longer than God intended: bringing into existence millions of beings more than were contemplated in creation; and by this time become a perfect nuisance to the general plan of the Almighty.

The admission of the error refuted, would sink the mind to the nether part of moral depravity, where darkness reigns with all its horrors.

The above arguments are introduced to show the absurdity of admitting a violation of the intentions of the Supreme Legislator.

I now turn on the other side and admit, as a fact, what I have sufficiently refuted, viz. that the intentions of God, as a Supreme Legislator, are violated by the sin of finite beings; but must beg leave to inform the reader that the proposition will by no means afford the intended consequences; but yields me an argument in favor of the finite nature of sin, which I do not want, and of which I shall make no other use than to explode the proposition itself. If any intentions of Deity were ever thwarted it proves, without evasion, that He is not infinite. If so, his will, or intentions, cannot be infinite and, therefore, the consequences intended by the proposition are forever lost, as they exist only upon the supposition of his being infinite. If it be argued that the intentions of Deity, as a legislator, are violated, not strictly in an infinite sense, but in some subordinate degree, it is giving up the ground contended for, to all intents; for if the intentions violated, be not infinite, the sin of violating it cannot be infinite. Again, if sin be infinite and unlimited, it cannot be superseded by any principle or being in the universe. For goodness cannot be more than infinite, neither is there a degree for Deity to occupy above it. And it may be further argued that the admission of the error refuted would be a denial of any supreme being in the universe; for as the Deity does not supersede sin, he cannot be superior to that which is equal to himself.

Again I further inquire, can that be considered as an infinite evil which is limited in its consequences? The answer must be in the negative. If sin be an infinite evil and infinite in its consequences as an evil not only all created beings must suffer endlessly by it, but God himself can never cease to experience the torment-giving power of that which he is unable to avoid. I say more, if sin be infinite and unlimited, for it must be unlimited if it be infinite. It follows that there is no such principle in the universe as any one property which we are wont to attribute to the Almighty, for if once we admit a principle of divine justice to have an existence, it is granted that sin is bounded by it, and, therefore, cannot be infinite and it is a fact that sin can nowhere exist only where it can be compared with justice. Again it ought not be supposed that the intentions of Deity were ever violated if we admit at the same time that he had power to avoid such violation. And who, in their senses, will say that that which is unavoidable by God is avoidable by man?

Enough, undoubtedly, is said, to show the egregious mistake of supposing sin to be infinite; and more need not be written on the subject were it not, by some, contended that Job 22:4, 5 ("Will he reprove thee for fear of thee? Is not thy wickedness great? And thine iniquities infinite?") is in full proof of the infinity of sin. In answer to this passage I need only turn the reader to Job, chapter 42:7, ("And it was so, that after the Lord had spoken these words unto Job, the Lord said unto Eliphaz the Temanite, My wrath is kindled against thee, and against thy two friends: for ye have not spoken of me the thing that is right, as my servant Job hath.") Observe kind reader, the words that are brought to prove the infinity are neither the words of God, nor of one whom he approved; but they are the words of that Temanite against whom God's anger was kindled for not speaking the things that were right.

Once more I close this part of my query. If sin be infinite in its nature, there can be no one sin greater than another. The smallest offense against the good of society, is equal to the blasphemer against the Holy Ghost. If what we call a small crime, be not infinite, the greatest cannot be; providing there is any proportion between the great and the small. Are not the words of Christ in Matthew 12:31 where he speaks of sins and blasphemies that should be forgiven unto men, and the blasphemies that should not be forgiven men, a sufficient evidence that some sins are more heinous than others? Again, I John 5:16 ("If any man see his brother sin a sin which is not unto death, he shall ask and he shall give him life for them that sin not unto death There is a sin unto death: I do not say that he shall pray for it.") Here some sins are said to be not unto death, and some unto death.

Now, admitting the matter proved, that sin is not infinite. However, we will now attend to the direct evidence of the finite nature of sin.

The law which takes cognizance of sin is not infinite, not in the sense in which it is violated. It being produced by the legislature which I have before noticed, which is the capacity to understand, connected with the causes and means of knowledge. In order for a law to be infinite, the legislature must be also infinite; but man's ability to understand is finite and all the means which are in his power for the acquisition of knowledge are finite; all his knowledge is circumscribed and the law produced by such cases must be like them, finite. An infinite law would be far above the capacity of an finite being and it would be unreasonable to suppose man amenable to a law above his capacity to comprehend and yield to. All our knowledge of good and evil is obtained by comparison. We call an action evil by comparing it with one which we call good. Were it in our power to embrace all the consequence that are connected with our actions and intentions, our meanings would seldom be what they now are. Had it been so with the brethren of Joseph, when they sold him to the Ishmaelites, that they then knew all the consequences which would attend the event, they would not have meant it, as they did, for evil. But seeing with perfectly unbeclouded eyes their own salvation, and that of the whole family of the promise, they would have meant it for good, as did the Almighty who superintended the affair. Now the act of selling Joseph was sin, in the meaning of those who sold him, but it was finite, considered as sin, for it was bounded by the narrowness of their understanding, limited by their ignorance, and circumscribed by the wisdom and goodness of him who meant it for good. If this sin had been infinite, nothing we could justly call good could have been the consequences; But whoever read the event without seeing the best of consequences were connected with it?

The promised seed, in whom all the families of the earth are to be blessed, according to the word of promise to Abraham, was to descend from that family which was preserved through seven years of famine, was a consequence of the good intended in that event. And who, but God, can comprehend the infinite good contained in all the glorious plan of mediatorial grace? We then see that what in a limited sense, we may justly call sin, or evil, in an unlimited sense, is justly called good.

We say, of the top of yonder mountain, it is exceedingly high; and of yonder valley, it is low; and this we justly say by comparing one with the other, in respect to the center of the earth. But the moment we extend our thoughts to contemplate the millions of worlds in unbounded space, and take the whole in one grand system, the idea of high and low is lost. So is sin finished, when, by divine grace, our understandings are enlightened and we hear our spiritual Joseph say, "Grieve not yourselves, ye meant it unto evil, but God meant it unto good." It will be granted, on all sides, that no action unconnected with evil design ought to be considered sin, it is then an evil intention that constitutes an evil action. For instance, a man exerting himself to the utmost of his ability to save the life of his neighbor, accidentally takes his life, the consequences is not the guilt of murder, but heart aching grief for the loss of his friend. Again, a man exerting himself with all his ingenuity and strength to take the life of his neighbor, misses his intentions and saves his life from immediate danger; the consequences is not the approbation of a good conscience for having saved the life of his neighbor, but condemnation for having designed his death, and perhaps mortification in his disappointment. By these instances the reader may see that no act can be determined to be morally good, or evil by the consequences which follow, but only by the disposition, or intentions which the action possessed when the act was done. Then in order for the sin to be infinite, the in- intentions of the transgressor must be infinite, embracing all the consequences that can ever arise from what he does; but this is never the case with finite beings. We never know all the effects or consequences that will be produced from the smallest of those acts which we do in time. It is the immediate consequences which we have in our power to calculate upon and in them we are often deceived.

Our acts as moral accountables are all limited to the narrow circles of our understanding; therefore, our goodness is limited, being of the finite nature of our knowledge, and our sin is in the same finite and limited circle. It may be argued, very justly, that as no finite cause can produce an infinite effect, no finite creature can commit an infinite sin; and as every effect must stand in relation to its cause, so man being finite, can not be the cause of an infinite evil which does not stand in relation to man as the infinite cause.

Should the reader suppose, that admitting the act of selling Joseph was attended with unlimited consequence, in opposition to my sentiments wherein I limit all actions which originate in finite causes; I reply, as the act of selling Joseph respected the purpose of the Deity, and the plan of grace. Those who sold him do not stand as even the shadow of a cause, but only as instruments by which God effected his own divine and gracious purpose. Perhaps the reader, by this time, is ready to say, according to this reasoning, there can be no real evil in the universe. If, by real evil, be meant something that ought not be, in respect to all the consequences which attend it, I cannot admit its existence; for I cannot conceive of any productive cause whatever, that can be, strictly speaking, limited in its consequences. For instance, the first transgression of man, no one can suppose, has ceased in its consequences; for from that cause, the knowledge of good and evil exist in mortal beings, and when the effect of that knowledge will cease, I cannot imagine. If it be objected, that to call that a sin which produces an infinite continuance of good effects, must be absurd; I say, in reply, the objection comes too late; for it is already proved, that the consequences of an act do not determine whether the act be good or evil. I have, in the foregoing queries, spoken of that kind of sin which is productive of remorse; however, we read, be sure, of the sin of ignorance. Numbers 15:27, 28. ("And if any soul sin through ignorance then he shall bring a she goat of the first year for a sin offering. And the priest shall make atonement for the soul that sinneth ignorantly, when he sinneth by ignorance before the Lord. And it shall be forgiven him.") But this I conceive to be more of a legal than of a moral nature, and it is sometimes called error. It is in a thousand instance productive of sorrow and disappointment, but never of guilt. If we consider the Jews under the law, or the Gentiles, who the apostles says, were a law unto themselves, we shall find them exposed to guilt, on the same principle. Therefore, moral transgression must vary, as the knowledge and understanding of men vary, in various circumstances.

If it be thought by the reader, that I have passed over the Spirit of the law, which is love to God in a superlative degree, and an esteem for our neighbor equal to that which we have for ourselves; I answer, I have, not altogether passed by it. This law of divine love is that infinite law of perfection, which is higher than our capacities extend in our finite state. The law given to Israel, literally speaking, was only a shadow of the Spirit of love; and all our knowledge of moral holiness is but a faint resemblance of that sublime rectitude from which the most upright of the sons of men are at a great distance.

Having so much on the nature of sin, as to make the subject plain to the readers understanding, I will pass now to an inquiry into its cause, or origin.

The Origin of Sin

The origin of sin has, among Christians in general, been very easily accounted for; but in a way, I must confess, that never gave me any satisfaction, since I came to think for myself on subjects of this nature. A short chimerical story of the bard, John Milton, has given satisfaction to millions, respecting the introduction of moral evil into the moral system which we occupy. The substance of the account is, sometimes before the creation of man, the Almighty created multitudes of spiritual beings called angels. Some of these creatures of God were much higher in dignity and authority than others, but all perfectly destitute of sin or of moral turpitude. One dignified above all the rest stood Prime Minister of the Almighty, clothed with the highest missive power, and clad with the garments of primeval light; obsequious to nothing but the high behest of his Creator, he discharged the functions of his office with a promptitude and dignity suited to the eminency of his station and to the admiration of celestial millions. But when it pleased Jehovah to reveal the brightness of his glory and the image of the Godhead in humanity, he gave forth the commandment in Psalms 97:7 "Worship him, all ye Gods," and Hebrews 1:6 "and again, when he bringeth in the first begotten into the world, he saith, "and let all the angels of God worship him."

Lucifer, son of the morning, as Christians have called him, surprised at the idea of worshipping any being but God himself, looked on the son with ineffable disdain and in a moment grew indignant, rebelled against God, challenged supremacy with the Almighty, and cast his eye to the sides of the north as a suitable place to establish his empire. Legions of spirits followed this chief in rebellion, and formed a dangerous party, in the kingdom of the Almighty. The son of God was invested with full power as generalissimo of heaven, to command the remaining forces against the common enemy, and in short, after many grievous battles between armies of contending spirits, where life could not, in the least, be exposed, Lucifer and his rebellious party were finally driven out of heaven, leaving it in peace, though in a great measure depopulated!

God, having created the earth, and placed the first man and woman in a happy situation of innocence and moral purity, without the smallest appetite for sin, or propensity to avoid. The arch apostate enviously looked from his fiery prison, to which he was cosigned by the commandment of the Almighty, and beholding man placed in so happy a situation, in a capacity to increase to infinite multitudes, by which the kingdom of heaven would be enlarged, was determined to crop this tree in the bud. He there- fore, transforms himself into a serpent, goes to the woman and beguiles her, persuading her to eat of a fruit which God had forbidden, by which means he introduced sin into our system. I have not been particular in this sketch, but it contains the essence of the common idea. I shall now put it under examination, looking diligently for the propriety of accounting for the origin of moral evil. In this way, and first, of this memorable rebellion in heaven! It seems that this rebelling angel was always obedient to the commands of his Maker until the hour of his fall; until he felt the emotion of pride, which lifted him above submission to the Son of God. This being the cause, I ask, was the rebellious angel ignorant of the real character of the Son, whom he was commanded to worship? If he were not, but knew it to be no other than the true eternal, his Creator, manifest in a nature which Jehovah created; if he loved his Maker as he ought to do, which none will pretend to dispute; he would have worshipped him with due reverence, the moment he made the discovery and heard the command: this no person in his right senses will dispute. If he did not know the real character whom he was commanded to worship, had he complied, he would have worshipped, he knew not what. And nothing can be more absurd, than to suppose that infinite wisdom would command his creatures to worship ignorantly. I ask, further, could purity produce impurity, or moral holiness, unholiness? All answers, no. Was not the angel holy in every faculty? Was not the command for him to worship the Son, holy and just? All answers, yes. Then from such causes, how was sin produced? The reader will easily see the question cannot be answered. Now, be so kind as to turn to the scripture, to which I have referred on this subject, and see if we have any authority for saying that either gods or angels refused to worship when God gave the command. "Again, when he bringeth the First Begotten into the world, he saith, let all the angels of God worship him." That this "First Begotten" is Christ, no doubt will be entertained. But when was he brought into the world? Before or since the first transgression of man? Since, most certainly. Then, supposing that millions of angels had sinned at that time, it could have had no consequences productive of man's transgression, as a cause cannot be posterior to its effects. Therefore, to suppose, that those angels who never sinned until long after man's transgression, were the instigators of what is called the fall, discovers a want of calculation, and further, what authority do we have for believing the command was disobeyed? We find nothing connected with either passage, the one in Psalms, or the one in Hebrews, which would intimate a refusal among the Gods or angels and I see no need for supposing, that by gods in one text, or by angels in the other, any other beings are intended than man. In respect to the command for all the gods to worship him, I observe, "They were called gods to whom the word of God came and the scripture cannot be broken." And the command for all the angels of God to worship him, stands on this proper ground. By angels, are meant messengers, who are employed by God, for the information of their fellowman; but as all the messengers, were inferior to the "Messenger of the Covenant," whom the Lord promised to send unto Jerusalem, it was suitable to show his superiority, by giving such a token in the scripture, as commanding all the messengers to worship him.

There is another passage in Isaiah 14:12, 13, "How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning! how art thou cut down to the ground, which didst weaken the nations! For thou hast said in thine heart, I will ascend into heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God: I will sit also upon the mount of the congregation, in the sides of the north." Here, I am told, we have a particular account of the sin which Satan committed in heaven. But as there is nothing in the passage, or its connections, that has in reference to any other creature, or being, as Lucifer, son of the morning, than the king of Babylon. I shall say but little upon it. Observe, the question is asked, "How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning? How are thou cut down to the ground, who didst weaken the nations? This Lucifer weakened the nations before he fell, but was unable to weaken them afterwards. He said in his heart, he would ascend unto heaven. Was this the sin of Satan, as is generally supposed? Was he not already in heaven? How then, could he say in his heart, I will ascent into heaven? I will not trouble the reader with anything so vague as the vulgar application of this scripture, only enough to show that it has no such meaning. The king of Babylon is pointed out in this prophecy as exalting his throne above the stars of God, which in a figurative sense, undoubtedly meant his exalting himself by the persecution and the reduction of the Jews, who are figuratively called the stars of God. Again this angel of light must have been very ignorant of the power and goodness of the Almighty, in order to possess a thought that to rebel against God could be of any possible advantage, or that he could have carried out and maintained a contest with him. If he were as ignorant as this the inhabitants of heaven must have been extremely uncultivated in that age of eternity and no great ornament to a place so much famed for glory and grandeur. If heaven, which is said to be God's throne, be or ever were inhabited by defectible beings, the place itself must be a defectible place; and why the Almighty God should take up his special abode in such a defectible place, surrounded by defectible beings, I cannot imagine; but I pass on.

After Satan was cast out of heaven, he could find no possible way to injure his adversary, only by contaminating God's innocent and unguarded creatures which he had just made, and placed in a happy situation before described. Here, observe, the matter appears strange. Did God not know the evil disposition of Satan? He forgotten the awful difficulty, but just settled? Or would he leave an innocent lamb to the ferocity of a bear robbed of her whelps? God had driven Satan from heaven, and from his own presence, but left him at loose ends to prey upon his tender and innocent offspring, whom he had just left in a defenseless situation on this ball of earth. What would appear more unnatural and shocking, than for a father to chase his enemy out at the door, but leave him to slay his defenseless children in the street? I shall, after what I have observed, beg liberty to say, I am so far from believing any such story respecting the cause of sin, that have not even the shadow of evidence, from the scripture or from reason to support the sentiments. But I have been told, that man, standing in a state of sinless purity, could not have fallen from that rectitude, unless there had been some sinful being to have tempted him. Admitting there is any force in this observation, it stands as directly against the fall of Satan, without a tempter, as it does against man's transgression without a tempter. Was man more pure before he fell than that holy angel in heaven? If not, how could that angel sin without a temptation easier than man, who was made in a lower grade?

But supposing that we should admit that God commanded an angel to worship his son Jesus, and the angel refused, and call that the first sin ever committed, it would not determine its origin or cause. A cause or origin must exist before the effect or production. So, after all our journeying to heaven after a sinning angel and after pursuing him to hell and from hell to the earth, we have not yet answered the question,

"What is the Origin of Sin?"

We have shown that the way this question has been generally solved is without foundation.

Having stated what I have been told was the origin of sin, and giving my reasons why I do not believe it, I now come to give my own opinion of the matter.

Scripture, with the assistance of that reason (without which, the scripture would be of no more service to us than they are to the brute creation), I shall take for my guide, on the question before me. Almighty God is a being of infinite perfection. This the scripture will support, and reason will declare. He is the author of our existence, being the creator of the first man and woman, the occasion of them being formed of the dust of the ground, and the director of that providence by which we are all introduced by ordinary generations. Our Maker must have had a design in the works of his hands; this the scripture argues and reason says. The whole of Gods design must be carried into effect and nothing more admitting him to be an infinite being. It may assist us in arriving at a satisfactory solution of our subject, to consider in the first place, the origin of natural evil. This is unquestionably the necessary results of the physical organization and constitution of animal nature. In the elements of which our bodies are composed and in their combination in our constitution, we evidently discover ample provision for the production of all manner of disorder to which they are incident, and even of morality itself. A careful examination of our natural senses as mediums of pleasure and pain, and health and sickness, will very naturally lead to a consideration of these same sense as being the origin of sin, as far as we can see, of our thoughts and volitions. With these senses are necessarily connected all the various passions which we possess and which are ever in accordance with the ideas and thoughts by them created.

From the ever changing combination and various evolutions of these our senses, thoughts, ideas, appetites, and passions are found to originate all that variety of moral character which is found in man.

It has long been the opinion of Christian diviners that natural evil owes its origin to what is denominated moral evil or sin, but however respectable this sentiment may be considered on account of respectability of its advocates, we feel fully convinced that the very reverse of the opinion is true. The doctrine which we feel authorized to the reverse contends that natural evil is a judicial inflection on man for his sin, and therefore is the effect of moral evil; but the ground that we shall take is that natural evil owes its origin to the original constitution of our fleshly nature, and that moral evil, or sin, owes its origin to natural evil. In order to understand the truth of the position here taken, it is necessary only to notice, with due caution, the origin of our volitions. This in all cases is want. If man wanted nothing he would do nothing nor could he desire to do anything. Now want unsatisfied is an evil; and unsatisfied want is the first movement to action or violation. The motives which invites to action owes their strength to the nature and strength of desire which want creates, and the moral character of the actions depends on the character of the motive.

Thus man, as a partaker of flesh and blood, was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who subjected the same in hope, (Romans 8:20). This hope, which is that sure and steadfast anchor, which enters into that within the veil. And expectates in a life to come, is the title our creator has given us as heirs of that immortal and eternal life which are brought to light through the gospel. But from our natural constitution, composed of our bodily elements, we are led to act in obedience to our carnal appetite, which justifies the conclusion that sin is the work of the flesh, as expressed by Saint Paul in Galatians 5:19-21, "Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these: adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, Idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like: of the which I tell you before, as I have also told you in time past that they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God". Also read 1 Corinthians 3:3, For ye are yet carnal: for whereas there is among you envying, and strife, and divisions, are ye not carnal, and walk as men?"

If man had been wholly constituted of flesh and blood, both body and mind, so that he was no more susceptible of moral principles than the beast creation appears to be, then would he never have been capable of committing sin, or of enduring moral evil, any more than do the lower animals around us. We might have had the same natural appetites, desires, and passions which we now have, and might have strove, like all the other creatures to gratify them, and might have devoured one another all without committing sin, or feeling guilty, but we find in man what we may call a law of moral or spiritual life, of which Paul speaks in his letter to the Romans, where he is quite particular in setting forth the contrary working of the law of the flesh and the law of the Spirit of life, "For the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do. Now if I do that I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. I find then a law, that when I would do good, evil is present with me. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man: But I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my, and bringing me into captivity to the law of SIN WHICH IS IN MY MEMBERS," Rom. 7:19-23. There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit," 8:1, 2. These conflicting laws of the flesh and Spirit have always existed in man, from his first formation. So long as they both continue to exert their powers in opposition of each other, so long will sin remain and continue to produce condemnation. This law of the Spirit of Life is the Spirit of Christ, of which we read, "And so it is written, The first man Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was a quickening Spirit," 1 Corinthians 15:45. This we may say is the image of God in which man is created, as Christ is said to be the brightness of God's glory, and the expressed image of His person, Hebrews 1:3, "Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he had by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high."

By this accounting for the origin of sin we endeavor to set forth what we believe is the sense of the scripture representation of the subject. James says, "But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then when sin hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death," James 1:14, 15. In the forepart of Genesis the origin of sin is figuratively represented. There we are informed that man was placed in a garden of delight, to keep it and to dress it. The tree of life was in it, and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Man was bid welcome to the tree of life, but was forbidden the other. A subtle serpent comes to the woman, and tempts her with the forbidden fruit; she eats and gives to her husband, and he also partakes: Their eyes were opened to the knowledge of good and evil; they see that they are naked, and hide themselves from God; sewing fig leaves together for garments to hide their nakedness.

God comes into the garden in the cool of the day, calls for the man, and ask him if he had eaten of the forbidden fruit. He answers, that the woman whom God gave him gave unto him and he ate. The woman is next interrogated, and she lays it to the serpent’s guile. The ground is cursed for Adam's sake; and when he tills it, it is to produce briars and thorns. He is to eat his bread by the sweat of his face, and at last returns to the dust. The woman's conception was to be multiplied in sorrow, and her desire was to be to her husband, and he was to rule over her. The serpent was cursed above all cattle, was to go on his belly, and to eat dust as long as he lived. This is in short the scripture representation of the first sin, and I consider it to be figurative.

Should it be said that this garden was a literal garden, that the tree of life was a literal tree, and that the tree of knowledge of good and evil was also literal, I should be glad to be informed, what evidence can be adducted in support of such an idea. Where is the garden now? Where is the tree of knowledge of good and evil? Are those trees now growing on earth as literal trees?

We are not informed in the scripture that the garden has been carried off to heaven, or that either of the trees were transplanted there. It is written, that God drove the man whom he had made out of the garden, and placed cherubims and a flaming sword at the east of the garden, to keep the man from approaching the tree of life. If the garden was literal why could not Adam have gone into it on the north, south or west side? The pathway of understanding is now open and clear. God saw it fit in his divine plan of wisdom, to make the creature subject to vanity; to give him a moral constitution; to fix in his nature those faculties which would, in their operation, oppose the Spirit of the heavenly nature. It is therefore, said, that God put enmity between the seed of the woman and that of the serpent, and it was by the passion that arose from the fleshly nature, that the whole of the mind became carnal, and man was captivated thereby. "For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who hath subjected the same in hope, because the creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God," Romans 8:20. "And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shall bruise his heel," Genesis 3:15.

But perhaps the objector will say, this denies the liberty of the will, and makes God the author of sin. To which I reply, desiring the reader to recollect what I have said of sin in showing its nature; by which it is discovered, that God may be the innocent and holy cause of that which in a limited sense is sin; but as it respects the intentions of God, it is intended for good. It is not casting any disagreeable reflection on the Almighty, to say he determined all things for good; and to believe he superintends all of the affairs of the universe not excepting sin, is a million times more to the honor of God than to believe he cannot, or that he does not when he can. The reader will then ask, if God must be considered as the first, the holy and the innocent cause of sin, is there any unholy or impure causes? I answer, there is, but in a limited sense. There is no divine holiness in any fleshly or carnal exercise; there is no holiness nor purity in all the deceptions ever experienced by imperfect beings; and these are the immediate causes of sin; and as such, they make the best of men on earth groan and cry out, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Rom. 7:24. If it should be granted that sin will finally terminate for good, in the moral system, it will then be necessary to admit that God is its first cause, or we cannot say that God is the author of all good. If we say that sin is not for the good of God's system, but is a damage, we must also say that God would have prevented its taking place if it had been in his power; if it were not in his power, he is not omnipotent; neither can we say he is Supreme in an unlimited sense, as he was not superior to the cause which produced sin. But to say God is the author of sin, says the reader, sounds very badly, let you put what coloring you please upon it; and if I believe it I shall not dare to say it." Well, what shall I say in order to please? Say the devil was the author of sin. But is the devil a self existing one? Or did he make himself? "No; God made him to be a holy angel, and he made himself into a devil, by transgressing." Well, God made an angel, and the angel made a devil of himself, or anything else, proves that God was the first cause as much as anything I have argued. The objector will further say, that the angel was made a moral agent, and therefore ought to be considered the author of his own sin. But I say in reply, that if God produced an agency with the foreknowledge that the agency in question would produce sin, it argues that God is the first cause, and the agency the second and effective cause. If this mode of reason be faulted, I ask, is God not the origin and cause of moral righteousness? None can be perverse enough to say no; then I ask again, If the moral agency created by God, be not the original cause of moral transgression, by what rule of reasoning can it be made the original cause of righteousness? But I have before refuted the notion about this sinning angel. I now call the attention of the reader to man, which is our proper study; and attend the objection as it respects the liberty of the will. But in the first place, for the sake of the argument, I will consent any liberty of the will which is contended for, and then ask, what was the cause of man's having liberty of will? My opponent must allow it was God. Well, if the omniscient Father produced a liberty of will in man, and that liberty of will produced sin, is there any great difficulty in seeing that that is making God the original cause of sin in every sense that I have argued it?

What would the objector wish us to understand as the meaning of the term `will'? If it be any more or less than choice, I am at a loss about it. If it be choice, then what we have to look into is the liberty of choice. In order for choice to take place, the mind must have perceptions of two or more objects; and that object which has the most influence on the judgment and passions, will become the chosen object; and choice, in this instance, has not even the shadow of liberty. None will be vain enough to say that will, or choice, has any liberty before it exist. And choice does not exist until an object is chosen; And to say choice has liberty to refuse an object after it is chosen, is using violence on terms. And the same will be the conclusion if we take the word `will.' A person is invited by two friends, to make them a visit in the same afternoon, at their respective houses; he wishes to visit both, but cannot at the same time. In this circumstances, honored with both their invitations, he feels at a real loss what answer to make; both insist on compliance, with equal earnestness, and with equal influence on his judgment and passion, he is left without decisions. To end the affair, one of his friends says, I will go with you, this afternoon, and visit our friend. If you and he will return the visit next week. This presentation decides in the mind of him who was first invited, as the other consents to the proposal. Now, choice, or will is in favor of visiting, according to the last proposal made. Until the man willed to go, the will to go did not exist; it could have no liberty before it did exist. And after it did, to say, that that will which was to go one way was at liberty to go the other, is using the violence before mentioned. It is then evident that will, or choice, has no possible liberty. The objector will now move his position, and says it is the mind that has this liberty to choose or not to choose, or to will, or not to will. In order to determine this matter justly, I first ask, does the power of choosing exist in the mind, or in the object chosen? If it be answered that the power of choice is in the mind, and not in the object that influence the mind, the man who was at a lost to determine which of his friends to visit, while the object was in equal force on his mind, was entirely ignorant of it; and admitting it was so, it might as well have been otherwise, for the power of choosing in his mind did him no good; he was, after all, dependent on a certain circumstance, which, being attached to one object, made it preferable to the other. Again admitting the power of choice to be attributed to the mind, and not to the object which gives perception to the mind and influences it, it must be as easy for the mind to choose a minor, as a major object. It will be granted on all sides, that persons may choose an object in preference to another, which is not half so valuable; but this is always in consequence of error in judgment. Now it is as objects appear to the mind, that we ought to consider them in our present query. Supposing a poor man, who has a wife and some hungry children to feed, is afforded a dollar or a guinea for a days work. He does not know the value of either, not being acquainted with money, or its value, or the nature of the metals which are stamped with value. He consults, or means to consult the good of those for whom he is willing to labor, and would, if possible, receive that which would do the most good towards removing their wants. And says to himself, the dollar is much the largest, and the probability is, it is worth three times as much as the guinea. And at last he is convinced that this is the case. Now, I ask you, in relation to my argument, which one of those pieces of money would he be most likely to choose? The answer is the dollar. But I ask why? If his mind be at real liberty it is no more attached to the dollar than to the guinea; the influence which the dollar has on his mind more than the guinea destroys not the liberty of the mind to choose the guinea, I wish to be told why he is more likely to choose the dollar instead of the guinea? Or to alter the statement, so that the mind is not deceived. The man perfectly knows the value of both the pieces of money; the good of his wanting family is what he wishes to consult, which of these would he most likely choose in this case? Answer, the guinea. Why? Is there any reason, or is there not? There is, and it is the greater value; therefore the objects governs the choice. I ask, in the above instances, had the mind any power or liberty to choose the object which appeared to be of the least value, and refuse that which appeared the greatest? I am sure there is not a person in the world who would say that it had. Again, admitting, for the sake of argument, that the mind possesses this imaginary liberty; I then ask, how come it possessed such liberty? Answer, God gave it. Then the matter stands thus, God produced a mind, and give it liberty to will, or choose, and it wills or chooses. I ask what is the original cause of this willing and choosing? The reader will easily see, that if I grant my opponents argument, it will not be to his advantage. Again for the last time, if God give to man a liberty whereby he can choose or refuse the same object, did he not give his creature a liberty which he did not, himself, possess? Did not the Infinitely Wise eternally know all he himself would do? It must be granted that he did. Then I ask again does he possess any liberty in his nature, where by it is in his power to abandon the general system contained in his divine omnisciency and embrace one entirely different? I am sure there is but few in the world who would but say, as did the apostle, "He cannot deny himself." If the reader possesses any ability which is not in his Creator, I would ask, first, where he got it? And, secondly, if the Almighty knew all the consequences, that would arise from such an ability? If the answer be in the negative, it argues that his wisdom is finite and limited, and that he does not know, but this unaccountable ability of willing and choosing may finally destroy his whole plan in creation, providence, and redemption! If it be granted that he did know all the consequences that would arise from this ability of willing and choosing, which is called liberty of will, it is denying its existence. For if those consequences are all known, it argues they were all certain, and therefore, unavoidable.

Having, as I hope, to the readers satisfaction answered the objections in respect to the liberty of will, I would again invite him back to our subject.

The immediate causes of sin are found in our natural constitutions, and the most distant of the immediate causes are the same as the most distant of the immediate causes of our virtue; but the most immediate cause of our virtues and our vices are extremely different. For instance, two men meet at an inn; both of them have families which are in want of food; they have each fifty cents, which they have just taken for their day's work. One says, to the other, come, sit down, and we will take some drink for our comfort after a hard day's labor. The other reflects in his mind, and says to himself, to let my children suffer, at home, to gratify my company in what is indifferent to me, would be abominable, having no particular appetite for liquor; he, therefore refuses, bids his company good night, goes to buy the necessary provisions for his family, and goes home. He has done as a virtuous, honest husband should do. The other possesses a violent appetite for liquor; the moment he comes where it is his want over powers his love and duty to his family, the latter object being at a distance, and the former being nigh; he calls for drink until he spends his fifty cents, and then goes home to his expecting family intoxicated. In this, according to the scriptures, though he were a professed Christian, he is worse than an infidel.

In the mirror presented, the reader may see, that these two men acted equally alike from their natural wants, appetites and passions. Had either of them any wants, appetites or passions, neither of them would have done any thing at all.

They would not have labored for the money; and if they had the money, they would not have laid it out in any way possible. Therefore, we see, that want, appetite and passion, in one, produced virtue, and in the other vice. But the still more immediate causes were not the same in both persons; and the consequences to them, in a moral sense, differ as much, as did the most immediate circumstances which produces their conduct. One felt the approbation of a good conscience in having done what cool, dispassionate reason dictated; the other, as soon as his eyes is opened to see what he has done, is struck with condemnation for having violated the dictates of that law of prudence and equity; of which he was susceptible.

A beggar, influenced by hunger, calls at the door of the affluent, for food; he knows it is there; his appetite is good; the object magnifies to his senses; but by one who knows the love of property more than the want of food, he is sternly denied. The beggar prostrates himself and moves his suit in language of distress, reducing his petition to only a piece of bread; The covetous man is a little moved, with some small feeling of compassion, but fearing if he should bestow, he should, in consequence, be troubled again, bids the beggar to depart and leave him. The beggar's object was food, his passion was hunger; he acted up to the influence of his object, and did all in his power to obtain it. The others object was the saving of his property, and his passion was covetousness; he acted up to the influence of his object, to the gratification of his passion. Now, had the circumstances been varied so much as this, that he did not think his giving, at that time, would ever induce the beggar to call again, the probability is, his object and his passion would have both been different; to feed a hungry man, would have been his object and charity his passion.

Man's main object, in all he does, is happiness; and were it not for that, he never could have any other particular object. What would induce men to form societies; to be at the expense of supporting government; to acquire knowledge; to learn the science, or till the earth, if they believed that they could be as happy without as with? The fact is, man would not be the being that he now is, as there would not be any stimulus to action; he must become inert, therefore cease to be. As men are never without this grand object, so they are never without their wants which renders such an object desirable. But their minor objects vary, according as their understanding vary, and their passions differ.

Then, says the objector, there is no such thing as disinterested benevolence. We answer, words are used to communicate ideas; there is that, often, in our experience, which is meant by disinterested benevolence. An American is traveling in Europe; he meets, in the street, a young and beautiful fair, bathed in tears, her breast swollen with grief. And her countenance perfectly sad. His heart fraught with the keenest sensibility is moved compassionately to inquire the cause of her grief; he is informed that her father, in a late sickness, became indebted to his physician twenty guineas, for which he was that hour committed to goal when he had but partially recovered his health. Our traveler no sooner hears the story, than he advances the twenty guianes to discharge the debt, and gives her fifty more as a reward for her generous concern. Our traveler did not expect any pecuniary reward, either directly, or indirectly. His charity is called disinterested benevolence. But strictly speaking he was greatly interested; he was interested in the afflictions of the father and child; their relief was his object; charity his passion. Now, did he not act for his own happiness? Yes, as much as ever a man did in his life. What must have been his misery, possessing the same disposition, without the means to meet the need, and relieve. And what a sublime satisfaction he enjoyed, by the bestowment of his favor! Sacred truth informs us, "It is more blessed to give than to receive." We find some men honest and industrious; who think, and think justly, that happiness is not to be found any other way. Others are indolent and knavish, and they expect to obtain happiness in so being. But they are deceived in their object; and will finally learn, that they must be, what conscience has often told them they ought to be, honest and just, in order to be happy. The objector will say, to admit that our happiness is the grand object of all we do, destroys the purity of religion, and reduces the whole to nothing, but selfishness. To which we reply, a man acting for his own happiness, if he seek it in the heavenly system of universal benevolence, knowing that his own happiness is connected with the happiness of his fellow man, which induces him to do justly, and to deal mercifully with all men, he is no more selfish than he ought to be. But a man, acting for his own happiness, if he seek it in the narrow circle of partiality and covetousness, his selfishness is irreligious and wicked. We know it is frequently contended that we ought to love God for what he is and not for what we receive from him; that we ought to love holiness for holiness sake, and not for any advantage such a principle is to us. This is often what we have been told, but what we never could see any reason for, or propriety in. I am asked if I love an orange, I answer I have never tasted one; but am told; I must love the orange for what it is! Now I ask, is it possible for me to either like or dislike the orange, in reality, until I taste it? Well, I taste of it and like it. Do you like it? Says my friend, Yes, I reply, its flavor is exquisitely agreeable. But that will not do, says my friend; you must not like it because its taste is agreeable, but you must like it because it is an orange. If there be any propriety in what my friend says, it is out of my sight.

A man is traveling on the sand of Arabia, he finds no water for a number of days, the sun scorches, and he is exceedingly dry; at last, he finds water and drinks to his satisfaction; never did water taste half so agreeable before. To say, that this man loves water because it is water, and not from the advantage he receives from it, betrays a large share of inconsistency. Would not this thirsty traveler have loved the burning sand as well as he did the water, if it would have tasted as agreeable, and quenched his thirst as well?

The sweet Psalmist of Israel said, "Oh taste and see that the Lord is good." And an apostle says, "We love him because he first loved us." What attribute do we ascribe to God, that we do not esteem on account of its advantage to us? Justice would have been no more likely to be attributed to the Almighty than injustice, if it had not first been discovered that justice was of greater advantage to mankind than injustice. And so of power, were it of no more advantage to human society than weakness; the latter would have been as likely to have been esteemed an attribute to God, as the former. If wisdom were of no greater service to man than folly, it would not have been adored in the Almighty, anymore than folly. If love were no more happifying to man than hatred, hatred would as soon have been esteemed an attribute of God as love.

Undoubtedly, God loves without an influential object, as it would be erroneous to suppose that an infinite being could be operated upon. He loves because it is his nature to love. An apostle says, "God is Love," The sun does not shine because the earth is influencing it. It is the nature of the sun to shine. But all created beings love because of influential objects; and they always love according to the influence which objects have on their minds and passions.

It seems then, says the objector, that our vices are not to be attributed to the devil, but to the influence which the object has on our minds.

Surely the reader ought to expect, that after we have denied the existence of a being, we would also deny the existence of his power. Perhaps however, the reader may be surprised, to find that we do not believe in the existence of a being so universally acknowledged among Christian people, and which perhaps, has been of as much advantage to some, as the goddess Dianna was to the craftsman of Ephesus. But we are willing to give our reasons for not believing with the multitudes, in this particular. A created individual being cannot be in more than one place at the same time. But how many millions of places must this evil angel be in, at once, in order to perform the business which Christians have allotted him? In order for us to believe in such a being, we must give him the omnipresency of the Almighty, which belongs to none, in our opinion, but our maker.

Again to admit the existence of such a being, would be of no avail, as there is nothing for him to do. There is, says the objector; he tempts men to sin. But does he tempt men contrary to their passions and the influence of their motives? Answer, No. Then the temptation is of no possible consequence. Supposing a man to be exceedingly hungry, and an agreeable meal is set before him, and he is invited to refresh; at that moment, the devil comes and tempts him to eat, what effect would the temptation have on the hungry man? Or supposing, instead of tempting him to eat, he tempts him not to eat. Would he be likely to succeed?

But What Means the Scripture
Which Speaks of a Devil?

Who is this creature who was a liar from the beginning? We answer, we have no objections to believing that there is such a devil as the scripture speaks of. He is called the old serpent, and is the same we have described, which beguiled the woman in the beginning; and is the carnal mind which is enmity against God. "I will put enmity between thee and the woman," said the Lord. The apostle said "The flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh, that ye cannot do the things you would." And that this was the first beguiler, we may learn, from the scripture, before quoted which saith," Lust when it conceived, brought forth sin, and, sin, when it was finished, brought forth death." An apostle also says, "When a man is tempted, he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed.

Any person, who is wholly directed by a carnal mind, may justly be called a devil, as in the case of Peter and Judas. As our Lord said to the Jews, also, "Ye are of your father, the devil; and the lust of your father, you will do." But says the objector, do you think our Saviour was tempted by the power of his flesh, when it was said he was tempted by the devil? We ask in our turn, for what is this particular circumstance introduced? If we cannot prove from our own experience that we are tempted by some other being than our own fleshly appetite, would it be anything more than a speculative belief to admit another tempter? But says the objector, That does not answer the question. Then let us look at his temptation. When he hungered, he was tempted; by what? and to what, Answer, by hunger, to turn stones into bread. Here was a fleshly appetite. When he had a view of all the kingdoms of the earth and their worldly glory that surely was to become a temptation to the base nature. Here was an appeal to the natural ambition, such as give rise to the victories of Alexander. When on the pinnacle of the temple, the tempter gave the appeal to satisfy the ambition to cast himself down, as it was written concerning him, that God would give his angels charge over him. Here was that passion which gives rise to presumption, and wishes to avoid duty. But it is said, the devil taketh him about, thus and so; not literally, however, for there is no mountain in the world that commands a prospect of but a small part of the kingdoms of the world. In a word, the scriptures inform us that he was tried in all points as we are, yet without sin. If, therefore, we know how we are tested and tried, we know also how he was tried. It is my conviction, that we ought not to argue that for truth, in matters of this nature, which we have no knowledge of by experience.

Having illustrated the original cause, and the secondary cause of sin, I pass to take notice of its consequences.

The Consequences of Sin

In order to have our work plain before us, I observe, sin is the works of the flesh, which are opposed to that true light, "Which lighteth every man who cometh into the world." And Paul, as quoted, says they are manifest. "Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these; Adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like:" Galatians 5:19-21a. These are the sins which our fleshly minds are daily producing and their consequences are witnessed by a miserable world. By these sins, with their associates, mankind is rendered miserable indeed. Social and domestic happiness are frequently destroyed.

Idolatry is the sin of worshipping that which is not, in reality, the true God. The old serpent could never hold the creature in captivity, if he did not allow him a god to worship, and religious duties to amuse him. Man is constituted in such relation to God; that to worship is perfectly natural. Then, in order for the carnal mind to take the lead of the whole man, it must introduce a god to worship that does not put restraints upon the activity of the carnal man. But demands certain duties whereby this god will be pleased, while making the creature believe that this God is the true god, and that those religious duties are of the genuine kind. But this God will surely possess all the vile passions of the old Adam, and those religious duties must consist in certain rites which bear no relationship to heaven born charity, or deeds of kindness. An Almighty, omnipresent, infinitely good and wise, may be talked of; but his wisdom, power, and goodness must be ignored; and he must be a great many millions miles away, fixed to a specific place, yet everywhere present; Infinitely wise and powerful, yet the author of a system that demands everlasting misery to those who violate his will; possesses infinite wisdom, yet, is disappointed in his plans; loves some of his creatures, hates others; is pleased and displeased with the conduct of his creatures; is perfectly unchangeable, yet loves at one time and at another time hates the same object. Such an idol will answer for thousands. Now what are the consequences? Answer, one nation supposes to itself the only favorite of God; others are hated of him, and hated by him. If God hates those who hate him, we ought to do as our God does, and hate them also. One denomination of Christians has different ideas of the attributes of their God from another; and they are violently apposed to each other; they are at swords point; and call each other heretics, and pronounce endless torment and wrath upon each other. All such religion is of the flesh; the wisdom of it is not from above, but it is earthly, sensual, and devilish, and those who embrace it are tormented by it. Turn to history, calculate the rivers of blood which have been shed on account of religious disputes and ask yourself the question, Is this religion masterminded by a supreme being. The devil will have religion, and will have it maintained as long as he can: but then, he must tell the people, that it is none of his but that it came from the true and living God, or they will not believe it. It is an object with the old serpent, to have a great many denominations, and to persuade them that they are indisputable right, and indubitable wrong, and to stir up their minds to maintain their respective tenets, and to wage war with each other, which he calls contending earnestly for the faith. Many who profess to be called by him, who loved sinners, to preach his Gospel, and who profess to adhere completely to the principles laid down by the Saviour and to walk in the path of meekness, gentleness and long-suffering, if they happen to think a little differently, in matters of faith, they are filled with great vehemency toward each other, which they call holy wrath, or indignation and you might as well reason with hungry lions, or tigers, as with them, for they worship the beast, and partake largely of his nature, and manifest it.

Did they worship the true God, in the Spirit of that lowly Nazarene, difference, in particular sentiments would not hinder their fellowship, and love of one another; all the religion in our world, founded on partial principle of man's inventions, pointing out particular modes of faith, and forms of worship, is from the carnal man. Discord and contention ensue; wars and fighting are the consequences: hatred, wrath, strife, emulation, and rivalryship rage in the minds of those who possess this spurious religion.

What I say, is a truth of universal notoriety; and yet, what is very strange is, people are not convinced of it. As is a monstrous wolf should ravage in open day light, in the high and low part of the shepherds pasture, gorging his carnivorous appetite with the fat of the flock; and the shepherd thinks it is all right, because somebody has told him that that creature is a sheep, and that it will, therefore, do them no harm! How miserable has religion made mankind! But says the reader, it was sin that you were to tell the consequences of, not religion. We tell you, kind reader, that the religion of which we speak, is opposed to every degree of the Spirit of Life in Christ. Which has ever been revealed to mankind, and therefore, is sin; and that which is attended with the most pernicious consequences. It is this kind of religion which takes away the "key of knowledge;" varieties neither enter the kingdom of heaven themselves, nor suffer those to enter who would. All worship, which is dictated by modes and forms, as inventions of men, is opposed to the true worship. "The Father seeketh such to worship him, who worship him in Spirit and in truth." Nothing satisfies the carnal man better than religion; but it must be a child of her own and look just like herself. The carnal mind being the hotbed where all the roots of bitterness grow which trouble mankind, we ought to look there, for the foundation of all that religion which bear the features of the serpent. Pride is the most prominent characteristic of a fleshly mind, its religion dictates to look with contempt on those who are not from the same mode of faith, who do not subscribe to the same article of belief, and are not called by the same denomination; and says, "Stand by thyself, come not nigh me, for I am holier than thou." It dictates to give thanks for not being like others; it boasts with performances wrought with great pains and expense; it boast of having "borne the burden in the heat of the day." And dictates to expect more than others receive. "But the carnal mind," says the reader, "makes nonuse of the scripture, does it?" Always, be sure, where it is fashionable to believe them, and men are despised if they do not. Anything will do of which the creature is proud and is willing to persecute others for not adopting. But ought not men to be despised, and called all to naught, who do not believe the Bible to be the word of God? Men ought not be despised for not believing them; and if they are they ought not be despised, but pitied and enlightened. Remember our acceptable High Priest was one who could "have compassion on the ignorant, and on them who were out of the way." Emulation, or rivalry is one of the works of the flesh, and it is enmity against the meek and humble Spirit of Christ; and its consequences are pernicious beyond description. In matters called religion we see much of its iniquity, as well as in natural things.

One denomination wishes to rival another; one preacher wishes to rival another; and how often it is the case, that professed Christians will act more underhandedly to obtain an advantage over a professor of a different denomination, than a common jockey is willing to do, in order to obtain a bargain. And we will say no more, we have often seen, in the same churches, persons at such variance, about matters of their religion, that truth, seemed not to be regarded, in the least, on either side; each would strive to crush his brother, until two parties were formed, and a whole town set in an uproar. This is the religion which pleases the carnal mind, but it is death.

"From whence come wars and fightings among you? Come they not even from your lust, which wars against the soul?" It is recorded in the scripture, that the love of money is the root of all evil. But men would have no love for money were it not for the earthly advantage obtained by it. Then, the passion is really covetousness, and the consequences is mischievous to mankind.

One, for the sake of money, will steal, another will lie, another will counterfeit the currency, and another will murder. Were it not for the sake of property, would men do these things? Answer, no. Then the case is plain, that they both act from the same main passion, which is want, and to the same main object, which is happiness. But their minor objects and their minor passions vary. What need would there be for government were it not for sin? If all were willing to do, as they would be done by what an enormous expense would be saved; as it would render governmental laws useless.

But by reason of men's passion, and mistaken objects influencing them, our lives are exposed to be taken by our neighbors. When passion reigns all the tender charities of humanity are suppressed; all the bowels of compassion are frozen; a deaf ear is turned to the needy in their distress; the poor are despised by the rich, the rich is envied by the poor; parents are dishonored by their children; children are abused, and provoked to angry by their parents. The vile afflictions of sin will burn to the destruction of the sweetest harmonies of nature.

The Torments of Sin

Yet, listen to the worst of torments, in consequence of sin. "A wounded conscience, who can bear?" A fire that burns all the day long, a sword that continually pierce the soul, a sting that cannot exhaust its poison, a fever that never turns until the patient dies. A dart struck through the liver, what ails the sinner? Why his hand on his breast? There gnaws the worms that never dies, there burns the fire that shall never be quenched.

A mistaken idea has been entertained of sin, even by professors, I have often heard sincere ministers preach, in their reproofs to their hearers, that it was the greatest folly in the world, for people to forego salvation, in a future state, for the COMFORTS and PLEASURES OF SIN in this. Such exhortations really defeat their intentions. The wish of the honest preacher is, that the wicked should repent of their sins, and do better; but at the same time, he indicates, that sin at the present is more productive of happiness than is righteousness, but that sins bad results will, only come in a future age, and though righteousness is unrewarding as far as happiness and the fulfillment of man's pleasurable desires is concerned in this age. One must, nevertheless forfeit the bliss and delightful happiness that sin could offer him forever, settling for something that is much less rewarding in order to appease his Creator and escape his unmerciful wrath.

One can witness the heartache and misery of sin, yet the above statement would suggest that it is sin, not righteousness, that is productive of happiness. One who would hold with this opinion has not experienced a change; his passion is fear, his motive is escape and his heart is filled with unfulfilled and corrupt passion. He may abstain from some outward enormities, yet his heart is filled with the desire of them. Yet I have been told by persons of high profession in Christianity, that if they could be certain of escaping hell's torment that they would commit every sin to which their unbridled passion might lead them.

Sin deprives us of every rational enjoyment, as far as it captivates the mind; it is never able to furnish one drop of satisfaction to the spirit. Sin is a false mirror, by which the sinner is deceived in everything on which his mind contemplates. If he thinks of his maker, who is his best friend, it strikes him with awe, fills his mind with fearful apprehension, and he wishes there were no such being. If he thinks of any duty which he owes his Maker, he says, "God requires more of me than I can produce, therefore he is an unreasonable hard task master, and to do his bidding deprives me of my happiness and ability to survive in this age. I must rule my own temple. Religion is only calculated to blind men, and to make them miserable; righteousness blunts my passions, and deprives me of pleasures for which I long." But it represents "Stolen waters to be sweet, and bread eaten in secret to be pleasant." In a word, sin is of a torment-giving nature to every faculty of the soul, and is the moral death of the mind.

Sin is Limited

Well says the reader, Can sin have all those evil effects and not be infinite? Undoubtedly; as all those evil effects are experienced in this finite state. Thousands, who I hope, are gone to greater degrees of rest than the most upright who enjoy the dominion of the carnal mind. The effects of sin, as sin, are not endless, but limited to the state in which it is committed. This perhaps, will be contrary to the opinion of many who read this treatise, as they are want to suppose that there are three cardinal consequences produced by sin, viz. (1) Death temporal; (2) death spiritual; (3) death eternal. As to the first of these consequences, I say men die natural deaths because they are naturally mortal; but they are not mortal because of sin, for man was mortal before he sinned; if he were not, he never could have sinned. Our opponent will say, that the death of the body is the consequences of sin, when one man murders another; to which we reply, one man could not murder another if men were not mortal. Sin cannot be said to be the cause of natural death, any more than of natural life. We will acknowledge that sin is often the means whereby natural life is ended, and our opposer must acknowledge, that it is often the means of persons being introduced into natural life. Perhaps a hundred are introduced into existence by illicit connections, where one is taken out by malice pretense. But the meaning of the objector is that man became mortal by sin; to which we reply, if immortality be corruptible by sin, the Christian hope of immortality is a vain one. The death that Adam died in consequences of sin, happened on the day of transgression, if we may believe the scripture account about it; but Adam did not die a natural death, on that day, nor for some hundreds of years afterwards.

The way in which many have tried to reconcile the scriptures with their traditions, in this matter, appears strange to us; they quote 2 Peter 3:8, "But, beloved, be not ignorant of this one thing, that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day." And as Adam died short of a thousand years, he died in the day of his transgression. But in order for the text to read to their meaning it ought to read thus, "One day with the Lord is a thousand, and a thousand years is one day." As they understand the text, the conjunction `as' has no possible meaning. In respect to spiritual death, we believe it was all that was meant by the word," In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." But if eternal death were intended, there was no recovery for man. Why divines have carried this matter so erroneously beyond all scriptural testimony, we cannot imagine. But it is said, spiritual or moral death would be eternal, were it not for the dispensation of the Gospel, by which death is swallowed up in life. So we might say of any thing else, even of a momentary nature; it would be eternal if it were never to end. The days of a man's life would be eternal, if they were never to end. The spring would be eternal if it were not succeeded with the summer. A rose would be an eternal flower, if it never withered, and youth would be eternal, if it were not for old age and death. But what do all such arguments avail? The grand sublime and glorious system of God, carries every thing away that it births from mortality and time.

We have already hinted, that sin might have consequences which were not evil, but not as sin. By the infinite wisdom and goodness of the Almighty, sin may be of advantage, even to the sinner himself, but we say again, not as sin. If the infinitely Wise and Good intended any one thing for good, which we rightly call sin, that event in respect to the divine intention, is not sin. We have introduced a circumstances, in the forepart of this work, in which, what we are now endeavoring to illustrate, may clearly be seen. It is evident that that which Joseph's brethren meant unto evil God meant unto good. Now the immediate consequence of the sin, to them, was guilt of the first magnitude. Who could calculate the one half of what they endured in consequences which God intended, in the issue of event, were altogether beneficial; and those who committed the sin, by the mercy of God were made partaker of the benefits contained in the purpose of him who meant it for good.

Again, it is evident from the scriptures that Herod, Pontius Pilate, the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, were gathered together against the Lord, to do what the council and the hand of the Almighty had determined to be done. "The kings of the earth stood up, and the rulers were gathered together against the Lord, and against his anointed. For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel were gathered together. For to do whatsoever thy hand and thy council determined before to be done," Acts 4:26-28. Had Herod, Pontius Pilate, the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, any better meaning, in crucifying Christ, than Joseph's brethren in selling Joseph to the Ishmaelites? All who read the question will answer, no. But the sacred text says, they were gathered together to do whatsoever God's hand and council had determined to be done. Now we ask, was not the determination of the murderers of Christ, the same, with the determination of Divine Wisdom? Says the reader, I cannot say it was not, and yet I dare not say it was. We will then answer, the Almighty intended all they did, should be done; but he intended it for a very different purpose from what they did, who did it. They intended the destruction and overthrow of the doctrine which Christ preached, and they hoped the things which he had spoken, concerning them, would fail of taking place. But the means which they used to oppose the cause of Christ, were those which God intended to promote it. They missed of their intentions, and the Lord carried the whole of his into effect. What Christian is there in the world, who will say, the consequences of the death of Christ are not good? or, that those who were his murders for whom he prayed on the cross, will not receive an advantage from his death, which they meant for evil?

Or who can limit the good contained in the design of the Almighty? But will this rule do, says the reader, to apply to all sin? We answer without hesitancy, that we fully believe it. Food for the body would never please the appetite, unless we first experience hungry; the cooling spring would not be sought for, if men were never thirsty; health could never be prized, could we not contrast it with sickness; ease is appreciated by the remembrance of pain; and a physician would never be wanted if it were not for our infirmities; a Saviour would never have been praised by his redeemed had they never been in bondage; the song, "Thou hast redeemed us to God, out of every kingdom and nation," could never be sung, had redemption not been needed; a fountain would never have been opened for Judah and Jerusalem to wash in, from sin and uncleanness, had it not been for sin and uncleanness.

Then, says our opponent, we may do evil, that good may come. This objection has often been stated to us in conversation on this subject. Our reply is short. There is a self contradiction in the objection; to do anything whatever, for good, is not a moral transgression. Had Joseph's brethren been taught of God that it was necessary for them to sell Joseph to the Ishmaelites, that he might go down to Egypt, and there prepare for the famine and they had done it for the good which God intended, it would have been no more sin in them than there was in the design of God. Then it is plain, that to do evil that good may come is impossible.

Again, had Herod, Pontas Pilate, the Gentiles and the people of Israel, intended the good which God intended in the crucifixion of Christ, sin would have been out of the question. Saint Paul ask the question to his opposers, after he had argued, that where sin abounded grace did much more abound, "Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound?" and answers it thus, "God forbid. How shall we, who are dead to sin, live any longer therein? If we are truly enlightened into the nature of the all abounding grace of the Gospel, it causes us to die to sin, and if we are dead to sin, we shall not live in it. God has forbidden it, in the nature of things and rendered it impossible.

As we have limited sin in its nature, the reader will not expect to find unlimited consequences attached to it in this work. Were it so, that the fullness of the divine law was perfectly comprehended in the mind of the creature and he should go contrary thereto, his sin would be as infinite as the law transgressed; but we argue, that the law transgressed, is a law formed in the mind of an imperfect being by the imperfect knowledge which he obtains of the divine law, which is no other than God himself. This knowledge being imperfect, forms a law like itself, imperfect and mutable; and an imperfect, mutable law does not afford data from which to argue endless consequences. The sacred oracles declare. "The soul that sins shall die." If it had added and said, "and shall never live again." It would have carried the consequences of sin infinitely farther than the Holy Spirit intended. Sin is death to the soul, as long as it sins, be that time longer or shorter. In order to argue an endless consequences, we must first state an infinite cause; and as we have argued sin on a finite scale, and in a limited circle, we must rationally limit its consequences.

We will now state two particulars which the reader will find argued in the course of this work, state our opponents objections against them, answer those objections, and introduce our second general inquiry by stating a third objection.

1^st Man is dependent in all his volitions and moves by necessity.

2^nd The Almighty has a good intention in every volition of man.

Objection first. If man moves by necessity, why do the scriptures abound with exhortations and admonitions to dissuade from sin and so many inducements to persuade to holiness and virtue? And why are there requirements in the law, to which man is under the necessity of going contrary?

Objection second. If God has a good intention in every action of volition of man, why is it said in the scriptures that he is grieved and provoked with us?

The proposition against which the first objection stands, answers the objections in all its parts. It was in the system of divine wisdom, that man should experience a consciousness of sin and guilt without which the subject of my inquiry could never have existed. If sin and guilt had never been introduced into our system the plan of grace by atonement could never have existed, providing there had been no prohibition communicated to the intelligent mind; and on the other hand, if the mind possessed as much liberty to go contrary to inducements, as it does inclinations to follow them inducements would have no possible effects, exhortations, admonitions, and warrings would be of no possible service.

If God purposed that man should come to the knowledge of his own infirmities in the way that he does he must have intended all the means whereby the purpose might be accomplished. And if he designed that any degree of moral holiness should be found on earth, such inducements must influence the minds of men, which would necessarily produce it. That God does in a strict sense of speaking, require more of any of his creatures than they are able to perform is inconsistent with dictates of good reason, and destitute of scripture authority; and has no better foundation for its support than an idea that darkness originates in the sun, or light in an opaque body. But does not God require perfect holiness of man? Does he not command strict obedience to every jot and tittle of his law?

We have before argued that the Spirit of God's law, in its infinite fullness, was above the capacity of man in a finite state, in which he was made subject to vanity; and that it was a limited knowledge of the law only that was introduced to the creature's understanding, and that for the purpose, that the offense might abound. Then says our opponent, if you are correct in this statement does it not prove that the requirements is more than the abilities of the creature can perform? And how can the difficulty be removed?

The proper answer to this question is derived from a due recurrence to the original constitution of man. If we believe that man, as a moral being, was constituted to occupy this moral state only and that his whole existence is limited to this state, then must we conclude that in this mortal state when we find health and sickness, pleasure and pain, virtue and vice, happiness and misery, the law of moral rectitude, being obeyed so far as to correspond with the law of physical organization, which is productive of the natural health of the body, it answers the full extent of its purpose and is as fully obeyed as a creator designed it ever should be. It is evident that the design of the Creator in the laws of corporeal, or animal nature embraces not only all the health and pleasure which corporeal beings enjoy; but also all the sickness and pain they endure. So likewise, in constitution of man, as a moral being, the law of moral rectitude was designed to administer not only those moral enjoyments, which are far the sweetest felicities with which we are blessed, but also those pungent compunctions of conscience which are our bitterest sufferings. If therefore we extend our views no farther than man's earthly state, we view it perfectly philosophical to conclude that it was no more the design of the Creator that man should here enjoy perfect righteousness, free from the alloys of gilt, than it was that he should here enjoy uninterrupted health and ease of body.

But in agreement with our view before expressed concerning man's original constitution as a moral being, in which he was made subject to vanity, we embrace the doctrine of future immortal life, in which state man will be as free from sin and condemnation as that immortality state will be free from sickness, corruption and death. We, according to their views, look for present obedience to the divine law in that glorious constitution manifested in Christ, who hath abolished death and brought life and immortality to light through the gospel, and who is said to be, the Lord our righteousness.

We come to take notice of the second objection. There are many passages of scripture which represent the Almighty as possessing irritable passions like his creatures. We are told that it repented him that he had made man on the earth and that it grieved him at his heart. These expressions are strong in their indication of changeability, as any that might be chosen. An apostle exhorts not to grieve the Holy Spirit; and it is not infrequent that God provoked to anger and jealousy, according to scripture.

Our opponent will not argue that we ought to understand those scriptures as strictly and literally true: no man in his senses can believe them so, and yet believe the Almighty to be unchangeable. Supposing our opponents should give their own opinion of this question; we have no doubt but that it would remove the objection to all intents. We understand those scriptures, as many others do, to be spoken according to the dark understanding of man, who is ignorant of the real character of God; and according to the representation made by the law to unreconciled minds. To admit, in a strict sense of speaking, that God was ever grieved to the heart for what he did himself, or for what his creatures do, is more than we can do and believe in his perfection. Saint James says. With God there is no variability, or shadow of turning. This expression is as strong and indication of the unchangeability of the Almighty, as any that might be chosen. Saint Paul informs us that God works all things after the council of his own will. Our being led by a carnal and fleshly mind, is undoubtedly what the Apostle meant, by grieving the Holy Spirit; as the motions or volitions of the carnal man are opposed of those of the heavenly; but that the eternal Spirit of God ever felt grief is more than we can rationally admit, as that would reduce the Almighty to a state of suffering. It is very evident, that the scripture represents the Almighty in extremely different characters; and we confess we cannot reconcile them in any other way, than by two covenants, or what is the same, flesh and Spirit. Our ideas of God, while under the legal dispensation, walking in the fleshly mind are consonant to that character which the scripture represents our Creator in, as wrathful, filled with indignation toward us for our sins, and every day angry. Those ideas which the mind entertains of the Father of all mercies when enlightened by the Spirit of life of the New Man, and while walking in the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus, which makes us free from the law of sin, are altogether consonant to that endearing character given in the scripture, of our Father who is in heaven, who causes his sun to shine on the evil and on the good; and sendeth rain upon the just and upon the unjust; who loved us while we were yet sinners, and sent his son to die, in attestation of his love to his creatures; who is good unto all, and whose tender mercies are over all his works; who is of one mind, and changeth not.

Says our opponent, if the Almighty govern all the affairs of mankind, according to his own appointment; if he were never disappointed; suffered no violation of will; but does, in all things, and by all things, maintain and support his own eternal system of divine goodness, what room do we find for the necessity of atonement, whereby peace is made by the blood of the cross? By this question we come to our second general subject,

Atonement for Sin?

In our inquiries on this momentous subject, we shall first examine three doctrinal tenets on atonement; from which, we shall beg leave to dissent, and give our reason thereof.

Secondly, show the necessity of atonement, and show where satisfaction must be made.

Thirdly, inquire into the personage and character of the mediator, who makes the atonement, and his ability to perform the work.

Fourthly, of the atonement in its nature. Christians divines, in general, have agreed in supposing sin to be an infinite evil, being a violation of an infinite law, and therefore, that the law requires an infinite sacrifice; short of which no atonement could be made; that the transgression of Adam brought the whole human race into the same situation of sin and misery, and subjected them all to the infinite penalty of an infinite law, which they had violated in their parents, before they individually existed.

After the above agreement many different roads are taken; and divines of the greatest abilities, and of the first rank among the literates, have drained the last faculty of invention, in plodding through the dark regions of metaphysics, to bring up a Samuel to explain the solecism of satisfying an infinite dissatisfaction.

The plan of redemption, as held by many, may be reduced to the following compendium: God, from all eternity, foreseeing that man would sin, provided a mediator for a certain part of his posterity, who should suffer the penalty of the law for them, and these elect ones, chosen by God from the rest of mankind, will alone be benefited by the atonement; that, in order that the sacrifice might be adequate to the crime, for which, the sinner was condemned to everlasting, or endless suffering, God Himself, assumed a body of flesh and blood, such as the delinquent was constituted in and suffered the penalty of the law by death and arose from the dead. By this process the demand of the law was completely answered, and the debt due divine justice, by the elect, was fully and amply paid. But that this atonement does not affect those that were not elected as objects of mercy, but that they are left to suffer endlessly for what Adam did, before they were born. It is true they are cautious about saying, that God himself absolutely died! But they say, Christ, who was crucified, was really God himself, which must in effect, amount to the same thing. And in fact, if an infinite being did not suffer death the whole plan falls, for it is by an infinite sacrifice that they pretend to satisfy an infinite dissatisfaction.

Why the above idea should ever have been imbibed of men of understanding and study, we can, but scarcely satisfy ourselves; their absurdities are so glaring, that it seems next to impossible, that men of sobriety and sound judgment should ever imbibe them, or avoid seeing them.

We have already sufficiently refuted the idea of an infinite sin, which opens to a plain path, in which the mind may run, and run clear of all these perplexities which have served to confuse, rather than enlighten mankind.

If sin be not infinite, the dissatisfaction occasioned by sin is not infinite. Therefore an infinite sacrifice is not required, but for the sake of illustration, we will for a moment admit, that the doctrine of atonement stands on the ground over where we have just gone. We will state it as it is often stated by those who believe it, which is by the likeness of debt and credit, which he was unable to discharge. The Divine being cannot consistently honor, dispense with the pay, but says, I must have what is my due; but as the debtor has not the ability to pay the smallest fraction, Divine Wisdom lays a deep concerted mysterious plan for the debt to be discharged, and how was it? Why, for God to pay it himself!

Our neighbor owes us a hundred pounds, time of payment comes, and we make a demand for our dues. Says our neighbor, my misfortunes have been such that I am not the possessor of the smallest fraction of property in the world; and as much as I owe you I am worse than nothing. I declare to him positively that I will loose not so much as a fraction of the interest, and leave him. A friend calls, and ask me how I succeeded in obtaining my dues of my neighbor; I reply, My neighbor is not, nor will he ever be able to pay me any part of my demand. My friend says, he is sorry that I should loose my debt. I answer, I shall not loose it. I have very fortunately, in my meditation on the subject, thought of a method, by which I can avail myself of the whole, to my fullest satisfaction; and I think it is a method that no person in the world, but myself, could ever have discovered. My friend is curious, and impatient to know the secret, never before found out. The reader may guess his confusion, on my telling him, that, as I have that sum already by me, I am now going to pay up the obligation, before the interest is any larger! This has been called the Gospel plan, which contains the depths of infinite wisdom.

We should be pleased to see, what we have never seen: professors follow such example in obtaining what the poor widow, the fatherless, and the needy, owe them. But says the advocate for the plan, a distinction ought to be made between the persons in the Godhead, who paid this infinite debt to the first; therefore, it is not altogether like a person paying his own demand. We say, in answer, if the first and second person in the Godhead are not so essentially one, as to make the debts due to one belong to the other, and payment also, they are not essentially one, as to be represented by two distinct persons related only by Adam, who are co- in merchandise. But for the sake of carrying the argument still further, we will admit this variety of persons in an infinite indivisible being! And also the plan of atonement on the principle of the second person's paying the demand to the first, and here it will be necessary to introduce the third person in the Godhead, as it is contended that the third person makes known to the debtor, what the creditor determines concerning him.

Then the plan of the doctrine may be represented by the following similitude: A owes B the sum of one thousand pounds; the time of the payment comes, demand is made; A is not worth a farthling, neither is it in his power to raise a fraction of the money. B immediately commences a process against A, of which C, a friend of A's being informed goes to B, ask him how large a demand he holds against A; B informed him, a thousand pounds and the interest. And is A worth nothing? ask C. Nothing, answers B. Would you make a deduction of twenty-five percent if you could have the money down? ask C. Not the least deduction, answers B. You will at least throw in the interest, says C. Not the smallest fraction, answers B. Well, says C, if you have no mercy on the poor and distressed, I will have the pleasure of relieving the debtor alone; counts out the money in full, and receives the obligation to bestow on his friend, A. B sends a servant immediately, to inform A, that he has concluded to forgive him the debt. A is transported at the news, flies to tell his wife, and children, the tidings of mercy, and all join in praising such heavenly benevolence. C comes in, the same moment, with the obligation in his hand; modestly gives it to A, desiring him to accept it as a token of sincere friendship. A is confounded, and ask C, how he came by the obligation; C informs him, that he paid every farthing of the money for it, the creditor would not make the least deduction. We have the reader to judge, where the creditor showed any mercy to the debtor, and whether B’s pretension of favoring A, do not wear the appearance of hypocrisy. It is contended by those that hold to his debt, and the payment of it, that the salvation of the sinner is by being forgiven; yet they contend, that the debt is paid, But how he can forgive a man a debt and oblige him to pay it, is more than we can see.

Again admitting the system true, we wish to inquire into the propriety of an innocent person's suffering for one who is guilty. It is scripture reason and good law, never to condemn the innocent in order to exculpate the delinquent. Supposing a foreign court sends a person, who is old in conspiracies of blood, to America, to lay a deep concerted plan to murder the President of the Union, and a number of the first officers in the federal government; and he should so far succeed, as to engage a number in his wicked design, and finally makes the attempt; his plans are discovered by the government, and deterred, but not until numbers have fallen a sacrifice to his mischievous endeavors. The leader of these seditious murderers, is taken and condemned to be executed; and the voice of every friend of justice and equity is against the criminal, but what would be the consternation of the good people of the United States, on being informed, that the good President of the Union, the man in whom the people delighted to honor, was executed in the room of the seditious person, and the wicked murderer set at liberty? Is it impossible to conceive that there is a single person in the world, who would call this a just execution? If it is said that the president freely offered himself in the room of the criminal, it alters not the case, in the eyes of justice. If an innocent man can justly be put to death, because he consents to it willingly, a guilty man may be acquitted because he prefers it. But it is further agreed that the authority had the power to raise the president from the dead, which done, renders the work just and glorious. We say, in answer, that if the authority had this power, it might as well have executed the real criminal, and raised him from the dead, as to performed this work on one who was not guilty. What is the most shocking of anything, in this system of atonement, is, the partiality represented in the Almighty; for admitting the plan rational, as it respects those circumstances, in which we have shown its absurdity, what can we find in scripture, or reason, that justifies such infinite partiality in our Creator? Or can in the least, serve as evidence to prove him possessed of it. Have we not reason to believe our Creator possessed of as much goodness as he has communicated to us? Can we rationally believe, that he is wanting in those principles of goodness which he has placed in our understanding. When he saw the whole progeny of Adam in the same situation, by reason of sin, no one more guilty than another, why should he purpose a plan of mercy for some few of them, and disregard the awful circumstances of the rest? The sacred oracle declares God to be no respector of person; if this be true, he is not a partial being. Jesus taught the character of God to his disciples, by turning their attention to nature, observing the equal distribution of rain and sunshine, on the evil and on the good, on the just and on the unjust. Supposing Joseph had dealt out bread plentiful to two of his brethren in Egypt, and had starved the rest to death, would it have looked like impartiality? It is argued, that none of them deserved a crumb from Joseph, whom they had sold; and if he pleased to give to one, and not to another, he had a right to do so. Then we say, he had a right to be partial.

We are traveling through a large and extensive woods, and many miles from any inhabitants; we find ten persons who are lost; they have been out of provision for several days; and having fatigued themselves, in wondering from hill to hill, from stream to stream, striving, to the utmost of their ability to find inhabitants; having give up all hope of ever seeing their homes again, and having, in their minds, bid their wives and children a long farewell, they are waiting for hunger to do its last work! The moment we discover ourselves to them, with large supplies of wholesome and rich provisions, every eye glistens with unexpected joy; the current of life starts afresh in their veins, and they all advance to meet us on their enfeebled hands and knees, with eagerness to receive the staff of life! We hasten to improve the opportunity of showing our sovereignty and goodness; we feed five of them to full, the other five, we neglect. They beg for the smallest crust, which we do not want, but to no effect. Those whom we feed solicit us, every mouthful they eat, to bestow some on their fellow sufferers, but we refuse. We tell them, however, not to construe our conduct into partiality, but to learn our power and sovereignty by it. The five whom we have fed, we assist out of the woods, and leave the rest to their wants!

We inquire still further, did the Almighty know before he made man, that he would become a sinner? Did he know he would deserve an endless punishment? If the answer be in the negative, it supposes God to be wanting in knowledge, and that he created beings at an infinite risk, as he did not know what would be the consequences. If the answer be in the positive, it proves an infinite cruelty existed in God; for unless that was the case, he would never have created beings, who he knew would be infinitely the losers by their existence.

Those who believe in the system which we are explaining, believe in the existence of the devil, who's existence we have refuted in this work. We are willing, however for the sake of the argument, to admit the existence of their God, and the devil likewise. But wish to inquire, which of them is, in reality, the worst being. God when he created mankind, perfectly knew that some of them would suffer endless torment, for their sins; he must, therefore, have intended them for that purpose. For it is inconsistent to suppose, that the Almighty would create without a purpose; and his purpose could not be contrary to his knowledge. The matter then stands thus, God created millions of beings for endless misery which they could not escape; the devil is desirous of having them miserable and does all in his power to effect it. Now reader, Judge between these, had the devil been consulted, by the Almighty, when he laid the plan of man's final destiny, we cannot conceive him capable of inventing one more eligible to his infernal disposition, than this which we are now disputing.

As reason will not consent to the plan of God, as described in the foregoing scheme, we will show that the scripture equally oppose it. It is granted, that Jesus Christ died for mankind, as the scripture declare; but not in the way, in which millions have believed. But supposing he died instead of the sinner, in the way which we dispute, we still wish to prove, that he died for the whole of Adam's posterity as much as he did for any.

If Isaiah did not believe that that would be the case, we can not reconcile his words to his opinion which we find in chapter 53:5, 6, "But he was wounded for our transgression, he was bruised for our iniquities; the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed. All we, like sheep, have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way; and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all." Saint Paul must have been of this opinion, when he wrote to Timothy, or his words are not expressive of his belief. "For there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus; who gave himself a ransom for all, to be testified in due time," 1 Timothy 2:5, 6, "My little children, these things write I unto you, that ye sin not, and if any man sin we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous; and he is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world," 1 John 2:1, 2. "But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels, for the suffering of death, now crowned with glory and honor; that he, by the grace of God, should taste death for every man," Hebrews 2:9.

The above scriptures, with their connection and corresponding passages, as fully prove that Christ died for all men, as any one thing can be proved from the Bible. Now, as there is not, in all the scriptures, a single hint to the reverse of these passages which we have introduced, it appears strange and unaccountable to me that any person, who professed to believe in the testimony of the Bible, should ever have entertained the idea, that what these passages say, is false, and that which is not said, in contradiction to what is, is true! Look, You readers, and submit to astonishment, at what has been believed in, as divine truth. An Almighty, infinite, wise and good being, creates an innumerable multitude of rational intelligences; they rebel against him, and raise an infinite dissatisfaction in his mind toward them; this infinite dissatisfaction gets removed toward part of the offenders, by the sacrifice of innocence; With the rest God is still displeased; yet, he is Almighty, and infinitely wise and employs his power and wisdom to make the works of his own hand as miserable as their nature will bear for being just such creatures as he knew they would be, before he made them. But it is argued, that God knowing what sort of creature men would be, did not influence them in the smallest degree, to be what they are. Let this argument be granted. But did not God know what would influence men to be what they are? Answer, Yes! Was it in his power to remove this influential cause? If it were why did he not do it, if it were likely to displease him? If it were not in his power to prevent the mischief, we wish to know whether it were in the creature's power to prevent it? If it were not in the power of either of them to prevent the operation of things in the way in which they have, and do take place, Why is God's anger so hot against his poor impotent offsprings? It seems an unhappy circumstance, for both the Creator and the creatures. The Creator is not happy with his creatures; his creatures finds themselves introduced into an existence infinitely worse than none. We are born into this world of sorrow and trouble; the first vibrations of senses is want; we endeavor to supply our wants, and to maintain our existence, which our maker has bestowed upon us; but as soon as we come to years of understanding, we are told of an infinite debt which stands against us, which we owed thousands of years before we were born; and that our maker is so angry with us, and has been every since the debt was due, that he has pre- pared a furnace of endless flames to torment us in, according to the requirements of justice! My father gives me his farm, and puts me in possession of it; I am pleased and prize it very highly. In consequences of my possession, I paint to myself many pleasing prospects; but to my mortification, a person comes and presents me with a mortgage of my farm, for five times its value, the mortgage running so as to hold the possessor to clear it; I will leave it to the reader to say, whether my father was kind or unkind. Yet the circumstances into which the Almighty has introduced millions of his creatures, is infinitely worse according to the doctrine which we are examining. It is argued, with much assurance, that God has a just right to do with his creatures as he pleases, because he has it in his power so to do; but what he does, is right, because he does it.

If the above statement be just, moral holiness consist in power of action, and not in the disposition that designs the action. If so, our argument in favor of sin's existing only in the design of the actor, and not in the action, is groundless; and we are driven to say, that unholiness, or sin, is the want of power to perform an action; and holiness consist in having the power to do it. One man designs to murder another for his money, he makes the attempt, and fails; his sin consisted in not having the power to execute his design; but in the design there is no evil. On the other hand, he makes the attempt, and succeeds; here is no evil at all, because he had power to do it. On this principle, every thing that can be done is moral holiness; and everything that cannot be done, is sin, or moral evil.

Here we are presented with a picture the most to be dreaded, of anything which the imagination of man is capable of inventing. Power moving on in front, exhibiting tyrannic majesty in every action; and meager justice in the rear, obsequiously pronouncing all right! If these things be so, our senses are nothing but mediums of deception; and all our experiences has served us no other purpose than to make us more ignorant. Who is there in the world, possessing common sense, that does not dread, and revolt from power, in every instance where they see it connected with an evil disposition? Are we right in wishing our enemies weak? We are, and that because their strength being directed by their wicked design, gives us fear.

But for the sake of argument, still further, let it be granted, that God being supreme, had a right to do, because he had the power. And he created millions of beings, whom he intends for endless torment, and puts his whole design into execution; and this is called supreme goodness. Now we wish to know how a supreme evil could be describe? All will grant, that evil is in opposition to good; then an opposite description would be just. To create, with an intention to make eternally happy, and to put that design into execution, would be supreme evil! But according to the doctrine which we are examining God contains these two characters in himself, having created some for one purpose, and some for the other. It will be of no advantage to the reader to have the absurdity of the above proposition any more exposed, than enough to have it rejected. We never heard or read any argument to prove the propriety of the disputed proposition. It is a begged proposition and stands without the least shadow of evidence from scripture or reason, but it requires no great ingenuity to see what the chimera was invented for; without it, the whole plan and scheme of atonement, which we are now examining, would fall, for want of foundation.

There are some of Saint Paul's writings to the Romans, which have been used by divines, to prove the partial plan of salvation true of which, we think it will be proper to take notice, in this place Romans 9:21, 22, has been made great use of, in order to prove, that God made some vessels of eternal dishonor, and other vessels of eternal glory. The words read as follows: "Hath not the potter power over the clay of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor? What if God, willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction." Again, Romans 11:7 through the chapter, "What then? Israel hath not obtained that which he seeketh for, but the election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded (according as it is written, God hath given them the spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, and ears that should not hear unto this day. And David saith, Let their tables be made a snare, and a trap, and a stumbling block, and a recompense unto them; let their eyes be darkened, that they may not see, and bow down their back alway."

On these passages, and others like them, is built the doctrine of limited salvation, by Jesus Christ according to the foreknowledge and predestination of the Almighty. It is argued that those who are here called the elect, are those for whom Christ died, and those alone who will finally obtain salvation by him. But why any person would make such a mistake in reading this chapter, we are at loss to know. The salvation of the elect is not argued, in this chapter, but the certainty of salvation of those who were blinded and the propriety of believing it, occupies the greatest part of it. Observe the words next to those we have quoted above, verse 11, and 12 "I say then, have they stumbled that they should fall? God forbid; but rather through their fall salvation is come to the Gentiles to provoke them to jealousy. Now, if the fall of them be the riches of the world, and the diminishing of them, the riches of the Gentiles, how much more their fullness? Again, verse 15. For if the casting away of them be the reconciling of the world, what shall the receiving of them be, but life from the dead?" Again in his argument to the Romans, he endeavors to show them, by the similitude of the branches of the olive trees, that they ought to believe that those blinded ones, though broken off through unbelief, would be grafted in again. See verse 24; "For, if thou wert cut out of the olive tree which is wild by nature, and wert grafted contrary to nature into a good olive tree: how much more shall these, which be the natural branches be grafted into their own olive tree?" The apostle seems to be desirous to instruct the Roman Church, and argues the point fervently; see verse 25,26, "For I would not brethren, that you should be ignorant of this mystery (lest you should be wise in your own conceits), that blindness in part is happened to Israel until the fullness of the Gentiles be come in, and so all Israel shall be saved; as it is written. There shall come out of Zion the Deliverer, and shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob." Compare the last verse which we have quoted, with Lev. 26:44, 45. "And yet for all that, when they be in the land of their enemies, I will not cast them away, neither will I abhor them to destroy them utterly, and to break my covenant with them: for I am the Lord their God. But I will for their sakes remember the covenant of their ancestors, whom I brought forth out of the land of Egypt, in the sight of the heathen that I might be their God: I am the Lord." And Isaiah 14:25, "In the Lord shall all the seed of Israel be justified, and shall glory." Many like passages might be quoted from various parts of the scripture; but, perhaps the above will suffice for this particular purpose, more of the like nature, will be noticed in the sequel of this work.

The scriptures have been as much violated, to maintain the doctrine which we are examining as good reason is by supposing God to be so infinitely partial, as he must be, in the eyes of reason, in order to be what the doctrine represents him.

We shall now invite the attention of the reader to another system of atonement, which was undoubtedly formed, with a view to shun the absurdities in the former, and to get rid of some of the consequences that were naturally deducible from that idea of the suffering of Christ. This system supposes, that the atonement by Christ was not intended for the salvation of any part of the human race; that its main end, and sole object, was the glory of the supreme being, as manifested in his holy and righteous law. In support of this plan, it is argued, that it is inconsistent, for infinite wisdom and goodness to prefer an inferior object to a supreme one; that all creation, when compared with the Creator, sinks into nothing, bearing no possible proportion to the infinite Jehovah; of course, that god always has his own glory in view, as his supreme object in all he does. This plan agrees with the former, in supposing sin to be of infinite magnitude, and deserving of endless punishment; that as the law of God is infinite, like himself, finite man in infinitely to blame for not fulfilling all its requirements; and that the penalty of the law is endless misery, which misery Christ sustained; not with a view of acquitting the sinner, nor in room and stead of the transgressor, as is supposed in the other plan; but for the honor of divine justice and the glory of his Father. It is further argued, that by Christ's suffering the penalty of the law, justice is as fully satisfied, as if all mankind had been made miserable for eternity. And this being the case, it is now just and right for God to acquit as many of the sinful race of Adam , as is consistent with his grand object, which is himself; yet by no means rendering it unjust for God to punish, through all eternity, as many as is necessary, in order for the satisfying of the same grand object.

We must inquire into the property of the argument on which this plan of atonement seems to be founded, which is, that God always acts for his own infinite and incomprehensible glory; never stooping so low, as to act with an intention for the good of his creatures.

First we ask, is God as infinitely glorious as he can be, or not? If it be answered that he is, then if his object in all he does, is to augment his own glory, he never has, nor will ever accomplish his intentions. If it be argued that it is not to augment his own glory, but to secure it, and maintain it in its proper splendor, it argues it to be of a perishable nature, and that it would decay, were it not for the continual vigilance of the Almighty, in preserving it. If it be argued, that neither of these objects are right, but that it is the manifestation of his glory to intelligent beings, which is the grand design or object of God, in all his acts, without any reference to the effect which this manifestation has on those to whom it is made, we say, the object has now dwindled into annihilation; there is not the smallest imaginable atom of it left. To suppose, that any rational being can wish, or desire, to accomplish any piece of labor, without having any reference to the consequence, is too glaringly absurd, to need refutation. Now the nature of the proposition, which we are examining, confines the motive of Deity within himself, and himself from his creation. In order therefore, to look at the Almighty as he is by this doctrine represented, we must look at him as destitute of a creation, and view him abstractly from all his creatures. But may we ask, what title to give that being of whom we speak? The name Jehovah truly has reference to his self-existence, and to his character as giver of existence, also. The name God, implies a being who is worshipped. Lord signifies a possessor. I am that I am, has reference to an unchangeable being, but does not determine a being of goodness. I ask again, What do we know of an Almighty, only by his works? If his existence can be determined, by any other means, we are ignorant of the way. What do we know but by our senses? Have we any sense of good and evil, that does not concern created beings? We may say, if we please, that God acts from his own essential good, abstractly from his creation; but what do we mean by it? An action, for the good of any being presupposes that being in want; and if in want, then not infinitely happy. If God be not infinitely happy he never can be. We inquire further, by what data, can we determine that God is a good being? Can we determine it by any other criterion than by the effects of what he does, as it concerns his creatures? The truth undoubtedly is, that just as far as we can look into creation, providence, and redemption, and see the harmony and beauty of them, and see that all were calculated for the good of created intelligence, whom these things concern, we are satisfied, that he, who conducts the whole, is a good being. And if we say he is good, without this understanding, we acknowledge a proposition for which we are unable to offer the smallest reason.

Again, is it not wrong to make a separation where the Al- mighty does not? Is he not perfectly joined to his creation? Do we not live, move, and have our being in God? Are we not created of his fullness? Had Deity anything to create beings, but his own eternal nature? We know that it has been said, that God created all things out of nothing, but such an idea never will be imbibed by us, until we can form, in imagination at least, a notion, of how much nothing does it take to make the least imaginable something. If all things were created of the infinite Jehovah, as great a part of his creation as we take from him, so great a proportion we take from his fullness. God never could be more than infinite, in his fullness, then to take the smallest creature from him, which he created of that infinite fullness, you have left something less than infinite. Now, if it be argued, that God acts for the good of himself, considering his creatures to belong to his fullness, we are perfectly agreed; but to say, that the Almighty has, or ever could have a motive, in action, that did not embrace every consequence that could ever arise from what he did, would be limiting his omnisciency; or to say, that he did not intend good, to all whom his acts concern, would be limiting his goodness, and an impeachment of his justice.

We have before, in this work, contended, that all the attributes, which we ascribe to God, we call good, on account of the advantage which we derive from such principles. We are told of a God who acts for his own benefit, abstractly from his creation; and that in millions of cases, he finds it most for his glory to make rational, hoping, wanting creatures endlessly miserable; and this is called goodness. We are likewise told of a devil, who acts for his own gratification and delights in making God's creatures miserable, and this is called badness. But, for our part, according to such statements, as the difference between goodness and badness, is so small we can hardly distinguish it. It is profane, in our opinion, to attribute a disposition to the Almighty which we can justly condemn in ourselves. A man, who should act from such a selfish principle as is attributed to God, would render himself wholly unworthy of the protection of common law. And shall we thus represent our kind and merciful Father, from whom ten thousand streams of goodness continually flow to his wanting and needy creatures? No; let every vibration of senses within us acknowledge his bountiful hand, which is never closed.

We have already labored, in this work, to show, that sin is finite, and not committed against an infinite law, we shall, however, now call into examination a subject something like it, which is, that of penalty; as it is contended, that the penalty of God's law is endless punishment.

We first inquire, why does a legislature affix penalties to laws which it makes? Answer, the first reason is, the strength and security of government. Second, that the punishment may serve to reclaim the delinquent. Third, that the punishment of a criminal may serve to deter others from the commission of like crimes. Fourth, in many cases, to keep the delinquent, by confinement or death, from doing any more mischief. Now let us look into the government of an Almighty Being, and see how the matter of penalty will operate there. Observe the penalty is endless misery. We ask, is this necessary to secure the government of an Almighty Being? Would his government be in danger, if the penalty were not enacted to his law? Supposing a legislator of men had the power in their hands, of causing all the community on whom its laws were binding, to love their laws, in every requirement, and with vigilance to attend to the faithful discharge of their duties in all things, would it be necessary for them to enact penalties to their laws? Allowing the legislature to have such powers, who, in the world, would say, it is not best to exercise it; that it is better to have penal laws, and let the people have their wicked obdurate hearts, so that now and then we may have a poor criminal to execute? We can hardly believe that any will contend, that penalty is necessary in the law of God to secure his government. Is there any scruple respecting God's power to turn the hearts of his creatures as he pleases? If there be not, then there is no need of penalty in his law, in order for the security of his government. Second: is his penalty necessary, in order to reclaim the delinquent? Answer, that is impossible. The penalty being endless punishment, it can have no object in reclaiming the punished. The execution of such a penalty on any of God's creatures, would prove the contradictionness of his goodness, as no possible good could be communicated to a victim of such punishment. Divine truth says, God is good unto all, and his tender mercies are over all his works. To say, God is good to a creature of his, whom he irrevocably dooms to endless torments is a violation of our senses; and no person, in a moment of sobriety, will believe it. It is then evident, that such a penalty would not be necessary to reclaim the sinner.

Third, Is it necessary to inflict such a penalty on the transgressor, in order to deter others from the commission of sin? Answer, No. For according to the doctrine which we are examining, the first transgression committed, involved the whole human race, in the delinquency; and an execution of such a penalty, would be the endless misery of the whole family of man; there would not have been one left to be deterred from sinning, or even tell the news!

Fourth, Is the penalty necessary to keep the sinner from sinning any more? So far from that, this penalty would fix the delinquent in a situation in which they could do nothing but sin, to an endless eternity. No moral being can be miserable as suffering conscious guilt without sin; therefore, in order for endless misery to be inflicted, endlessly transgression is necessary.

Look, kind reader, and see what an absurdity lies here. Because a being has sinned once the law which he violated requires that he should continue in transgression! Well, he complies, will the law justify him? But, says the reader, I do not understand you. Why, the matter is plain; if a moral being cannot be miserable, without sin, he must continue in sin in order to be miserable. Then if God's law requires endless misery, it requires endless transgression! But, it is argued, That a law cannot exist without a penalty. This undoubtedly is an error. The largest signification of the word law, is governing power. See Romans 7:23, "But I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity unto the law of sin which is in my members." This law of sin in the members, which brings the man into captivity, is undoubtedly the power of the flesh, which lusteth against the Spirit, that we cannot do the things we would. Now, we ask, is there any penalty to this law? Does this law administer any condemnation to those who do not obey it? Most surely it does not. Then pass to the 8th chapter, and third verse; For the law of the Spirit of Life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death." This law is undoubtedly the governing power of the new man, which overcomes the carnal mind, and delivers the soul from the bondage of sin. We ask again, is there any penalty to this law? Is there a dispensation of condemnation administered by the law of life? Truth says, the wages of sin is death. Does this death flow from the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus? Surely not, "To be carnally minded is death." If carnal mindedness be that death, which is the wages of sin, surely it does not flow from the Spirit of life. "To be spiritually minded is life and peace." God's moral law is like himself, love; "God is love and he who loveth dwelleth in God, and God in him."

It requires all moral beings to love God and each other; and the reason why it commands this is, it is love itself. True, that soul is miserable that does not love God, and the reasons are, love is life and happiness of the soul, and hatred is its death and misery.

Although I think we have given unanswerable reasons, why we do not admit such a penalty as we have examined, we will, for the sake of the argument, still further allow it, and inquire into Christ's suffering it.

To say that Christ has suffered such a penalty is a contradiction in terms, because endless duration has not yet, expired. To say, that this penalty will ever be suffered by Christ, or any other being, is another contradiction in words; for an endless duration will never expire. Then to say, that such a penalty has been, or ever will be suffered, is erroneous.

If it be argued that Christ be a infinite person, and, therefore, could suffer an endless punishment in a few moments; we answer, it is not shunning the contradiction? If the position be moved, and the argument is, that he being infinite, could suffer as much in a few moments, as all mankind would to a endless duration, we ask, are there more infinite beings than one? All answers, No. We ask again, Is it possible for that infinite being to suffer? Even from our opponent, that an infinite being did not suffer; but that it was the finite nature which suffered, and raised from the dead, by the infinite; that it was the human nature which was made a sin offering; and that the divine nature gave victory to the human by raising it into an immortal life. Well then, the sufferings were finite, and could by no means answer the requirements of an infinite penalty.

The particular difference between this plan and the former, is in the intentions of the suffering of Christ. The former supposes that Christ suffered in room and stead of the sinner, so as to acquit all those from condemnation, for whom he died. This argues that the intentions of the sufferings of Christ was not the salvation of the sinners; but as we have before observed, the glory of the Supreme Being. But, that by the sufferings of Christ, the law is perfectly magnified, and honored; and that it is just, for God to acquit as many of the sinful race of Adam, as is consistent with his glory; but does not render it unjust, for him to punish, endlessly, as many as is necessary for the same grand object.

What is the Demands of Justice?

Now, admitting the penalty of the law to be endless, and that Christ suffered it in full, the law cannot now require the destruction of the offenders. How then, can we reasonably argue that it is for the glory of God to punish when justice does not require it? If justice does require it now, of any, it does of all. If it be argued, that divine justice does not require the endless happiness or misery of man, we say it is not a law which concerns mankind; and if we say, God's will, in the misery of man extends farther than the requirements of his justice, it is setting the Almighty against himself. Again, admitting such provisions be made, as render it consistent with justice, that all sinners should be emancipated from death and misery, does eternal love and mercy require less?

Supposing that five hundred Americans are in slavery at Algires; Our consul demands the price of their redemption, per man; he is answered, the price of the one is the price of the whole; and the price of the whole is the price of the one; the sum is five hundred dollars. This, the Dey says, is not of consideration for the slaves, but to show America, or the United States, his power, and the dignity of his government. Our consul obtains the money and pays it. Now, reader, do you think he would confine the benefit of his ransom money, to a part of those unfortunate Americans; and out of five hundred send fifty home to their wives, children, country and friends; and tell the remaining four hundred and fifty that the money was his own, and that he had the right to extend or not extend its benefits, as he pleased; and that it was his pleasure that they should all wear out a miserable life in slavery, where they might dream of liberty, but never enjoy it? The smallest degree of humanity would argue better things.

We have now examined the foundation of this plan of atonement, and it has removed out of our sight; we have sought carefully after the penalty of the law, and cannot find it; we have sought for the satisfaction of such penal requirements, admitting they did exist and find them not; we have admitted, for the sake of the query, that such satisfaction did take place, and we have sought for the consequences which are argued, and find them inconsistent with such promises.

Taking our leave of this plan of atonement, we shall introduce a third one, from which we shall dissent, and give our reasons for so doing. The plan agrees with the former, in respect to the law, its penalty and of the personage of him who makes the atonement, but it differs, in respect to the intentions of God, in the atonement, as far as the first transgression concerned mankind, it is believed that the atonement by Christ is fully efficacious; and that no man will, and can be miserable forever, on account of what is called original sin. And that, by virtue of the suffering of Christ, Adam and all his posterity were immediately placed in a state of trial, or probation, after the fall, such as Adam was in, before, but with this difference, viz. man now knows good and evil, and is possessed with strong appetite to sin; but has also, a portion of the divine spirit which is given to every man, for his profit to assist him in opposing these appetites, and subduing them.

Those who believe in this plan believe that it was in the power of Adam, as a moral agent, to have stood in a state of holiness and innocency; and that it is now in the power of every man, as a moral agent, to obtain the paradise which Adam lost. They do not admit, that Christ died for our actual transgressions, after we come to years of discretion; but of these we must repent, and beg for mercy, and God will forgive, on our humble and sincere application. The sum of this plan of atonement, made salvation possible to all, but certain to none. It argues, that it is the will of God, that all men should be saved, and come into the knowledge of the truth; that all should repent of their sins and receive the Redeemer on the reasonable terms upon which he is offering to us.

Those who believe in this plan, believe it possible for men to neglect those privileges, slight those merciful offers, and turn a deaf ear to all the warnings of the Spirit, until the day of their probation is ended. Whereby all that the Saviour has done is made of no effect unto them. And the thousands will be thus neglectful and be miserable as long as God exist, not however for the sin which Adam committed, but for their own personal transgression.

Before we put the foregoing system of atonement under examination, we will take notice of the character of the mediator, as believed in, by all those who belong to several systems of which we have taken notice, as we have not examined that particular, in our inquires on the systems preceding the one under consideration. They all contend that the Mediator is really God; that the Godhead consist of three distinct persons, viz. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, that these distinct persons are equal in power and glory, and eternally and essentially one.

The reader will observe our usual mode of reasoning, which is to admit, as truth, what we wish to oppose; and to oppose it, with the consequences which necessarily follows. For the sake of the argument, then, we admit the foregoing statement concerning Christ to be just; and then contend, that if he be the Son of God, he is the son of himself, and is his own Father; that he is no more the son of God than God is his son! To say, of two persons, exactly of the same age, that one of them is the real son of the other, is to confound good sense. If Jesus Christ were really God, it must be argued, that God really died! Again, if the Godhead consist of three distinct persons, and each of those three persons be infinite the whole Godhead amounts to the amazing sum of infinite multiplied by three! If it is said, that neither of these three persons alone is infinite, we say, the three together, with the addition of a million more such, would not make an infinite being. But supposing that we get over all those absurdities, and suppose that these three distinct persons formed the grand council in heaven, on the salvation of man, after the first transgression.

In this council, and on so momentous an occasion the first person addresses the other two, saying, the colony which we have just planted on our new made earth, has rebelled, and you know the penalty, which is endless misery, must be immediately executed on the two delinquents, unless a dispensation can be devised more favorable to the offenders, and equally satisfactory to Justice. As the attributes spoke in the first person that of mercy, speaks, in the second, and propose a pardon. Justice opposes, and contends that his honor depends on the penalty being put into execution. Mercy again replies, the second person in the Godhead shall suffer the penalty due to sin, and justice shall grant a man a second probation, in which he may secure the life, which he, by rebellion, lost. That reasonable conditions should be proposed, and the third person should make them known to man, and give him proper direction how to fulfill them; and if man faithfully attends to those conditions, he secures his happiness; if not, mercy makes no more request in favor of the offender. To this all agree; and it is registered accordingly.

It seems according to this plan, that man utterly failed, on the first trial, but now has the second opportunity. We would ask, is there any more certainty of his succeeding now, than there was before? Is it certain according to the plan, that any of Adam's posterity will obtain salvation? Is it not in the power of all men to neglect those conditions? If it be not it destroys the nature of the conditions, and of probation; if it be, then it is entirely uncertain, whether an individual soul will ever be saved by the gospel plan.

We have before showed it erroneous to suppose that any finite being could suffer an infinite punishment in any period of time; and we think it is also granted that an infinite being cannot suffer. But admitting the system of atonement to stand on the ground contended for, it was a matter of utter uncertainty, whether it would, in any instant, prove efficacious, as it respected the salvation of man.

A rich parent gives a large portion to his son, accompanied with good advice; the son turns prodigal, spends all, gets into prison for debt. The father still loves the son, pays his debt, lets him out of prison, sets him at liberty, and gives him a thousand pounds more, which is all he ever can give him, and tells him to be more prudent. The prodigal, no sooner than he finds himself this liberated, and in possession of a handsome property, goes into the same error which brought him to ruin be- fore, and finally meets the same consequences. The father has no more to give, the son becomes a vagabond. We ask, did the parent act the part of wisdom, any more than the son did? If he had acted wisely, would he not have said to him, Son, I gave you much at the first; I gave you good advice; I told you, that industry and prudence alone would secure you from want; I told you, though your property were large, unless you put your money to interest, or into trade, it must dwindle; that if you threw away your time in vain and foolish prodigality, the end would be what you have already experienced. And although I hoped better things of you, than a total neglect of my admonition, yet I feared; and for your good, have I retained one thousand pounds of what I intended to give you, which, had you been economical, I should, by this time, have committed to your care. But as you have conducted so foolishly, I must, for your benefit keep the remainder of your portion until you prove yourself a convert, from prodigality to economy.

If the Almighty were ignorant, at first when he put man in possession of privileges which he afterwards abused, it astonishes me that he should risk the last favor which he had to bestow, on principles which he had just seen fail. It will undoubtedly be acknowledged, by all, that Jehovah knew, as perfectly before the transgression as afterwards, what man would do, and how he would dispose of the advantages which he had bestowed on him. Then, we ask, if God knew how man would abuse those privileges, and knew he would be eternally miserable, in consequences, was it an act of kindness, in God, to grant man such privileges? We ask, again, was it possible for that to fail which the Almighty perfectly knew would take place? The answer will be no. Then, when we have consolidated the whole down to its real self, all the privilege which God gave to those whom he knew would render themselves objects of his displeasure, was a privilege of incurring to themselves endless misery; we say more, he insured it to them himself, by putting that into their hands, by which he knew it would be effected.

I give my innocent child a loaded pistol, which I tell him to discharge at a serpent, on his way where I have ordered him. I know perfectly well, when I give him the pistol, that he will carelessly blow his own brains out with its contents, and the serpent will go unhurt; the child's end happens, I leave the reader to judge, whether I am the murderer of my child; my conscience would inform me.

The Mediator suffered the penalty of the law, to reinstate man of probation; God made a revelation to mankind for their instructions; he inspired the ancient prophets to speak of the things of his kingdom, sent his Holy Spirit into the world, to lead and guide man into all truth; and all this is done, from the pure benevolence of God toward a sinful world, for its everlasting welfare, but all upon uncertainties! After all, man has in his power to frustrate the whole plan of grace, and render it abortive!

On the other hand it was possible for every son and daughter to accept Christ, on the very easy terms of the gospel obedience, and thereby to have secured the heavenly kingdom. This being granted, who knows they will not do it? Things that are possible may be done; and who can say, for certainty, those things which are possible, will not be affected? If it be an absolute certainty, that any will finally fail of gaining the prize, it is also an absolute certainty, that they have possible opportunity for it. If there be any opportunity, and the prize be attainable by all, there is at least some room for hope; and were it the real Christian hope it would be like an anchor to the soul, both sure and steadfast; but being founded in the creature, and not in God, it is wavering and doubtful.

It is Not God's Will
That Any Should Perish

(2 Peter 3:9)

On this system it would be absurd to argue the certainty of the endless misery of any of the family of man, as the salvation of the whole is possible; God out of love to his creatures, made it possible for them all to obtain salvation; indeed it is his will, that all should be saved from their sins, it is, also, the will of Christ and of the Holy Spirit; it is the will of all the holy beings in heaven, and of the saints on the earth; prayers are daily offered up, from the altar of sacrifice, for its accomplishment: And if it be not done, the whole Godhead will be disappointed; mourning, instead of rejoicing, will be the employment of the holy angels, and the saints will be stung with the keenest sensations of grief.

No one would dare to say that he believes God can be disappointed in any of his purposes: therefore those who believe in the system last examined, must be dissatisfied with it, if their eyes should ever be opened to see its consequences.

Having examined those several systems of atonement, in as concise a method as was convenient, and having given my principal reasons for not adopting either, I now beg the attention of the reader to my second inquiry.

Section 2