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Treatise on Atonement Section 2
The Necessity of Atonement, and
Where Satisfaction must be made
I have, already, entered my protest, against the necessity of atonement, on the principle upon which Christians have generally believed it, by showing the finite nature of sin, and the error of supposing that the law of God required the endless misery of mankind, or a penal requisition.
Atonement signifies reconciliation, or satisfaction, which is the same. It is being unreconciled to truth and justice, which needs reconciliation; and it is a dissatisfied being which needs satisfaction. Therefore, I raise my inquiry on the question. Is God the unreconciled or dissatisfied party or is it man? For our assistance on this question, let us turn our attention to God's dealing with Adam, on the day of transgression, and the conduct of Adam the transgressor. After Adam had eaten of the forbidden fruit his eyes were opened to the knowledge of good and evil: and he found himself naked and endeavored to hide himself from God, which he certainly would not have done had he considered his maker his friend. Sin produced two errors in the mind of Adam, which have been very incident to mankind ever since; the first was, he believed God to be his enemy, in consequence of disobedience; and secondly, that he could reconcile his maker by the works of his own hand. The first of these errors, we discover, from Adam's endeavoring to hide from God; and the second is seen in his endeavoring to clothe himself with the works of his own hands. It is true that a material change had taken place in Adam; but can we prove, that any alteration happens in God? It is very evident, that Adam was unreconciled to God; But it is equally evident, that God was not unreconciled to him. God's calling Adam, in the cool of the day, and asking him where he was; clothing him with a garment of skins and promising that the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head, are beautiful representation of the parental love and fatherly care of the Creator. It ought to be observed, that God pronounced no curse on Adam, but on the serpent. If the Almighty had been unreconciled or dissatisfied with his creature man in room of promising him a final victory over the serpent, the curse would undoubtedly have fallen on the object of his displeasure.
To say, that God loved man less, after transgression, than before, denies his unchangeability; but to say, that man was wanting in love to God, places him in his real character. As God was not the unreconciled party, no atonement was necessary for his reconciliation. Where there is dissatisfaction it presupposes an injured party; and can it be hard to determine which was injured by sin, the Creator or the sinner? If God was unreconciled to man the atonement was necessary, to renew his love to his creature; but if man was the unreconciled the atonement was necessary, to renew his love to his Creator. The matter is now stated so plainly, that no person, who can read, can mistake.
We shall now endeavor to prove, from scripture, that the atonement by Christ was the effect, and not the cause of God's love to man. See St. John 3:16, "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." According to this passage, nothing is more plain in the scripture than the idea of what Christ did for sinners, was a consequence of God's love to them. Again, verse 17, "For God sent not his son into the world to condemn the world; but, that the world through him might be saved." This passage says that God did not send his son into the world to condemn the world; but according to the general idea of atonement, Christ stood as the proxy of man and the world was tried in him, and condemned in him, and in him suffered the penalty of the law which man had transgressed. It is also said, in the text, that Christ was sent, that the world through him might be saved; which, if true, goes to prove, that the Father's object, in Christ's coming into the world, was the salvation of sinners, and not for the removal of any dissatisfaction, in himself toward them. Again, see Romans 5:8, "But God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." As the death of Christ is here spoken of as a commendation of God's love to us, it ought to be considered as an effect and not the cause of that love. Again, 1 John 4:9, "In this was manifested the love of God, toward us, because that God sent his only begotten son into the world, that we might live through him." If Christ's coming into the world as a manifestation of God's love to us, this love must have existed before he came, and his coming was an effect produced by it. Verse 10, "Here in is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his son to be the propitiation for our sins." Verse 19, "We love him because he first loved us."
From these passages, and many more which might be quoted, to the same effect, it is easy to learn, that what the Mediator did for sinners, was the consequences of and not the cause of God's love to us. God being infinite in all his glorious attributes, he can, by no means love, at one time, and hate the same object at another. His divine omniscience comprehended all the events of time and eternity; therefore, nothing could take place, to remove his love from an object on which it was placed. The Almighty had no occasion to dislike Adam, after the transgression, any more than he had even before he made him; for, he knew as well then, that he would sin, as he did after it was actually done. The reason we mortals love an object, at one time, and dislike it, at another, is the weakness of our understanding; we have not always the same view of the same object. We may slight an object of great value, its excellence's being out of our sight; and we may set our affections on one of no value, by erroneously attaching a value to it which it does not possess. But the Infinitely Wise is subject to no mistake; he comprehends the whole futurition of all mortal beings, and loves them as his offsprings, with a love consistent with his immutable existence. Therefore, it is evident, that God was not the unreconciled, and of course, did not require an atonement to reconcile himself to his creatures.
Let us now turn on the other side, and see if man be not unreconciled to God; and if it would not be more reasonable, to reconcile man to his maker, than to reconcile God to the sinner. See Psalms 14:2-3, "The Lord looked down from heaven upon the children of men to see if there be any that did understand, and seek God. They all are gone aside? They are altogether become filthy; there is none that doeth good, no not one."
The Apostle Paul, in the third chapter of Romans, giving a general description of mankind, introduces it with the passage from Psalms, which we have just quoted, and continues it by an assemblage of various passages, see verse 13 & c. "Their throat is an open sepulcher; with their tongue, they have used deceit; the poison of asps is under their lips; whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness; their feet is swift to shed blood; destruction and misery are in their ways, and the way of peace they have not known; there is no fear of God before their eyes." It is very evident that the Apostle meant to exclude none from this description, as the reader may learn from verse 19, "Now we know, that what things soever the law saith, it saith to them who are under the law; that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God." Again, 5:12, "Wherefore as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned." That the scripture abundantly proves, that all men are sinners, and in an unreconciled state, considered under the law, or in the earthly nature, will not be disputed by any. Then it is certainly man that needs reconciliation. Men, while dictated by a carnal mind are dissatisfied with God: they accuse him of being a hard task master, reaping where he has not sown, and gathering where he has not strawed. They think on the Almighty, but desire not the knowledge of his ways. They behold no beauty in him; he appears a tyrant, regardless of the happiness of his creatures. A consciousness of sin, without the knowledge of God represents deity as angry, and full of vengeance; in which sense, many scriptures are written, as we have before observed. How often do we find, that God has been provoked to wrath and jealousy, and his fury raised to a flame against, the sinner. And how often do the scriptures represent him repenting of his angry, and growing calm! All these scriptures are written according to the circumstances of the creature, and the apprehension which the unreconciled entertain of God. Viewing man in this state of unreconciliation to God, and holiness, it appears evidently necessary, that he should receive an atonement productive of a renewal of love to his maker. Without atonement God could never be seen as he is, "all together lovely, and the chiefest, among ten thousand," nor could he be loved with the whole heart, mind, might and strength. How often are men grumbling at providence, that things should be governed as they are? How often are men displeased at the Supreme Being himself? What an infinite number of hard speeches have sinners spoken against God? All which argue the necessity of atonement, whereby by these maladies may be healed.
What an infinite difference there is between the all gracious and merciful, and his lost and bewildered creatures? He, all glorious, without a spot in the whole infinitude of his nature; all lovely, without exception, and loving without partiality. Who can tell the thousandth part of his love to his offspring? And this invariably the same through every dispensation, without the smallest abatement. But what can we say, of man? Lost in the wilderness of sin, wandering in the bypaths of iniquity, lost to the knowledge of his heavenly Benefactor, and dissatisfied with his God; he goes on grumbling and complaining, attributing the worst of characters to the most merciful of beings and entertaining no regard for the fountain of all his comforts. God never called for a sacrifice to reconcile himself to man; but loved man so that he was pleased to bruise his son for our good, to give him to die, in attestation of love to sinners.
The belief that the great Jehovah was offended with his creatures to that degree, that nothing but the death of Christ, or the endless misery of mankind could appease his anger, is an idea that has done more injury to the Christian religion than the writings of all its opposers, for many centuries. The error has been fatal to the life and Spirit of the religion of Christ in our world; All those principles which are to be dreaded by man, have been believed to exist in God: and professors have been molded into the image of their deity. And become more cruel than the uncultivated savage! A persecuting inquisition is a lively representation of the god which professed Christians have believed in ever since the apostasy. It is every day practice to represent the Almighty so offended with man, that he employs his infinite mind in devising unspeakable tortures, as retaliations on these with whom he is offended. Those ideas have so obscured the whole nature of God from us, that the capacious religion of the human mind has been darkened by an almost impenetrable cloud; even the tender charities of nature have been frozen with such tenets, and the natural friendship common to human society, has, in a thousand instances, been driven from the walks of man.
But, says the reader, is it likely, that persecution ever rose from man's belief that God was an enemy to wicked men? Undoubtedly; for had all professors of Christianity believed, that God had compassion on the ignorant, and those who are out of the way, how could they have persecuted those whom they believed in error? But, with contrary views, those who professed to believe in Christ, who professed to be the real disciples of him who taught his disciples to love their enemies, have been the fomenters of persecution; they have persecuted, even unto death, those who could not believe all the absurdities in orthodox creeds. It may be asked, if those animosities did not arise from pride, ambition, and carnal mindedness? We answer, yes; and so does the god in whom persecuting Christians believe, for they form a god altogether like unto themselves; therefore, while they vainly fancy they are in the service of the true God, they are following the dictates of pride and unlawful ambition, the natural productions of a carnal mind? An atonement is the only remedy for the evil.
Men are dissatisfied with the Almighty and his providences; they are dissatisfied with, and enemies of, one another; whereas our true happiness consists in loving God, and our neighbors. Men in possession of vile appetites pursue, with greediness, their gratification; but still, they retain their wants, they are allied to heaven and holiness, and can never be happy without them. They are conscious of sin, and feel condemned notions resting on their minds; they look forward to the awful scene of dissolution, and stare back with horror. Death is the king of terrors to the unreconciled; how awful are their thoughts of death to those whose hopes are only the feeble production of their fears and wants, unsupported with divine evidence! Oh, how necessary is atoning grace, on such occasion, whereby a divine confidence may be enjoyed; the value thereof cannot be estimated by earthly treasures; all the shining dust of India, and the riches of the South, are poverty when compared with the riches of a reconciled mind.
Without atonement, God's glorious design, in the everlasting welfare of his offsprings, man, could never be effected; the ordination of an infinitely merciful God could never be carried into effect. The Almighty must not be deprived of the means of accomplishing his gracious designs. We read of his covenant with day and night, which cannot be broken; but it would be broken at once, should the causes cease that produce their changes. So of the covenant of eternal mercy, the testament of eternal life, it must be put in force by the death of the testator, and its life and immortal glory be brought to light through his resurrection. Let it be understood, that it is man who receives the atonement, who stands in need of reconciliation, who, being dissatisfied, needs satisfaction; and not place those imperfections and wants in him who is infinite in his fullness; and the doctrine of atonement may be sought for in the nature of things, and found to be rational to the understanding.
That man receives the atonement, was evidently the opinion of St. Paul, see Romans 5:11, "And not only so, but we also joy in God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the atonement." Were there a single passage in the scriptures that would reach half as far in proving that God received the atonement, as the one just quoted goes to prove that man received it, the statement might be considered more disputable than it now is.
We read, that men are now enemies to God, by wicked words, which teaches us that enmity is wickedness: Should we then dare to say, that God is our enemy? It is wrong for us to be enemies even to those who injure us, much more to those who never had it in their power to do us any harm. We wish to ask, Did any of God's creatures ever injure him? Surely not. Why then does he turn our enemy? He commands us to love our enemies; that we may be like him, but if he hates his enemies, we must hate ours if we would be like him, If he is not our enemy, he needs no atonement. But if men are enemies to God, they need an atonement to bring them to love him who loves them.
Here the reader will observe we shun those difficulties which have represented the gospel of Christ so inconsistent with his nature. We now view the Almighty the same yesterday, today and forever; and by no means changed in his disposition toward his creatures, but always designing and working all things for their good. Here is no need of the self contradictory notion of altering an unalterable being; of satisfying an infinite dissatisfaction: of reconciling a being who was never unreconciled of producing love in love itself: of causing an eternal unchangeable friend to be friendly, or of offering a sacrifice to the eternal Father of our spirits to cause him to love and have mercy on his offsprings.
How much more reasonable it is, to suppose ourselves in need of those alterations. But unhappily, men have looked at Deity through the medium of a carnal mind, and have formed all their evil tempers in Jehovah; like the deceived astronomer, who fancied he saw a monster in the sun, occasioned by a fly in his glass. The creature being in the medium of sight, was supposed to be in the object beheld; and though it was small in itself, and would have appeared so, could it have been seen where it was; yet carrying it into the sun, it magnified to an enormous size. So it is with the vile and sinful passions, could we behold them in ourselves, and view them as they are, they would appear in their finite and limited sphere; but the moment we form those passions in Deity, they magnify to infinity. Let a council of astronomers be called, who are all deceived by the fly; let them consult on the size of the monster, calculate how long it has been growing, and how soon it may wholly absorb the sun; let them endeavor to account for its cause, and analyze its constitution, inform us of the degrees of heat its lungs sustain, and how many degrees hotter it is than iron can be heated in a furnace. But here is room for disagreement, which may give rise to great disputations. To one it appears much larger than to another; they cannot judge alike, with regard to its age, nor how much larger it will grow. Some are ready to dispute its being a living creature, fancying it might be an opaque body. They are all agreed, that there is a phenomenon in the sun, but dispute, and even quarrel about its peculiarities. What would become of all their calculations the moment they should discover the fly? All would be gone, at once, and the sun would be relieved of the burden of so ponderous a monster.
How many various calculations have diviners made on the fury and wrath which they have discovered in God.
How much they have preached and written, on this awful subject; and how many ways they have invented to appease such wrath and vengeance! When we come to see the error, and find those principles in ourselves, all those notions vanish at once. The fly on the glass might easily been removed or destroyed; but had there been a monster in the sun, what calculations could mortals have made to remove it? Enmity in man may be overcome with love; but did it exist in God, it must be infinite and eternal.
To conclude, the supposition, that Deity receives the atonement, or any possible advantage from the Gospel plan; whereby any alternation is effected in him for the better, amounts to inexplicable absurdity of making omniscience more wise, omnipotence more powerful, justice more just; and of giving love the power of loving, of making mercy more merciful, truth more true, and goodness better; for these are the seven spirits of God, which are in the earth, and they are without the shadow of turning.
Having shown, as we hope, to the reader's satisfaction, the necessity of atonement, and where satisfaction must be made and reconciliation takes place, we shall pass to make some inquiries into "The Personage of the Mediator who makes the atonement, and his ability for performing the work."
We have already stated some of the absurdities contained in the opinion of most Christians, respecting the Mediator; we shall now be a little more particular on the subject.
We shall contend, that the Mediator is a created dependent being. That he is a created being is proved from Revelations 3:14, where he is said to be "the beginning of the creation of God." His dependency is proved, by his frequent prayers to his Father. That he acknowledged a superior when on earth is evident from many passages which might be quoted. See St. John 5:19, Christ here says, "the son can do nothing of himself, but what he sees the Father do." He acknowledges a superior in knowledge. See Matthew 24:36, "But of that day and hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father." And further, that he acknowledges a superior even in his resurrected glory, may be proven from his own words to his servant John, on the Isle of Patmos, see Revelations 3:12, "Him that overcometh, will I make a pillar in the temple of my God. And he shall go no more out; and I will write upon him the name of my God, and the name of the city of my God, which is New Jerusalem, which cometh down out of heaven from my God, and I will write upon him my new name." Four times in the above scripture he acknowledges a being whom he worships. Again, see Psalm 45:7, "Thou lovest righteousness and hatest wickedness, because God, thy God hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows." The reader will observe, we have ventured to put the word because, in room of the word therefore, in the quotation; But we have not done it without the authority of the original translation.
The difference is so essential, we cannot dispense with it. Observe, the writer of this Psalm addresses on God, and speaks in his address, of another. See verse 6, "Thy throne Oh God, is for ever and ever." This God is dependent on another, expressed in verse seven, "Because God, thy God, hath anointed thee. That the names, God, Lord, and everlasting father, are applied to Christ we shall not dispute; neither shall we dispute the propriety of it; but we do not admit that they mean the self-existent Jehovah, when applied to the Mediator. In the quotation from the Psalms, Christ is said to be anointed above his fellows. Fellows are equal. Who are Christ's equals? Perhaps the reader may say, They are the Father and the Holy Ghost; but we can hardly believe that Christ was anointed with the oil of gladness above his Father, neither do we believe any one will contend for it. We are sensible, that God speaks by the prophets of smiting man who is his fellow; but this fellowship must be different from the one just spoken of, and stands only in an official sense. The reader will then ask, Do we consider the Mediator no more than equal with man? We answer, yes, were it not that our Father and his Father has anointed him above his fellows. "Wherefore, God also hath anointed him and given him a name which is above every name," Philippians 2:9. For his exaltation, anointing, and his name he was dependent on his Father, and received them from him. This name he received, which was above every name was the name of God. It will be said that Christ taught the people that he and his Father are one. The oneness of the Father and the Son, is their union, and agreement in the great work which he has undertaken; and he prayed that his disciples might be as well agreed in the Gospel of salvation, as he and his Father were. "As Thou hast sent me into the world, so have I also sent them into the world, "St. John 17:18 The Father of all mercies sent his son into the world for a certain purpose; and there was a perfect agreement between them, in all things, He says he came not to do his own will, but the will of him who sent him. And again, "My meat and my drink is to do the will of him who sent me, and to finish the work."
The President of the United States sends a minister to negotiate a peace at a foreign court; this minister must conduct according to the authority which he derives from him, by whom he is sent and as far as he does, he is in his official character, the power that sent him. It is evident that Christ received the power which he exercised in the work which he hath undertaken, and that his kingdom was given unto him, which goes to prove, He did not eternally possess them; "And there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages, should serve him: his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed," Daniel 7:14. According to the prophecy here quoted, the dominion, glory, and kingdom of Christ were given unto him, the people whom he is to rule are given unto him. "Ask of me and I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession," Psalm 2:8. In Matt. 28:18, Jesus Said, "All power is given unto me in heaven and earth." In Matt. 11:27, "All things are delivered unto me of my Father." These and many more passages are found in the sacred writ, in support of the dependence of the Mediator on the Supreme Eternal, and that he derives his power and glory from him. But if Christ is essentially God, all these scriptures seem without just signification.
It is written, that man was created in the image of God; and, by the light of the gospel Saint Paul ventured to assert, that Christ is this image. The reader will do well to observe, that the image of a person, are not essentially one, but some knowledge of a person may be obtained by his true image. Christ being the image of God, it is by him we learn the nature of the Father. Christ saith, "No man knoweth the Father but the Son, and he to whom the Son revealeth him." Again, "No man cometh unto the Father, but by me." Saint Paul is particular on this subject in First Timothy 2:5. "For there is one God, and one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus." It seems by this testimony that Saint Paul was a stranger to the notion of Christ being essentially God, as it would be improper to call him a man, were that the case. If it be argued that Christ is God and man both, we ask, was it the whole divine nature which constituted the divinity of Christ? If this question be answered in the affirmative, we desire to know where that divinity is which constitutes the other two persons in the God head. If the question be answered in the negative, and it be argued, that the divinity which Christ possessed was an emanation from God, it is coming directly to what we contend for, viz, that he is a created being.
As we see from the prophecy in Daniel that Christ received his kingdom; so we are taught, by Saint Paul, that he will deliver up his kingdom to the Father, when he has accomplished the grand object of his reign, "Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father: when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority, and power. For he must reign; till he hath put all enemies under his feet. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. For he hath put all things under his feet, but when he saith, all things are put un- der him, it is manifest that he is excepted which did put all things under him, and when all things shall be subjected unto him, then shall the son also himself be subjected unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all," 1 Corinthians 15:24-28.
Enough perhaps, is written, on this part of our query, to make the matter plain to the reader, although much more might be quoted from the scripture, in support of what we have argued.
We next inquire, has the Mediator power or ability, to perform the great work of atonement, which is the reconciliation of the world? Those scriptures, with their connections, which we have quoted to prove the Mediator's dependency, abundantly prove the sufficiency of his power to accomplish the work in which he is engaged. If all power in heaven and earth be committed to Christ, no doubt can be entertained of his sufficiency. If the whole system of the law in moral nature be subservient to the design of the Redeemer, and if he holds in his hands the power of moral government, it certainly must be at his option whether men shall be reconciled to God, or not.
After Satan was cast out of heaven, he could find no possible way to injure his adversary, only by contaminating God's innocent and unguarded creatures which he had just made, and placed in a happy situation before described. Here, observe, the matter appears strange. Did God not know the evil disposition of Satan? He forgotten the awful difficulty, but just settled? Or would he leave an innocent lamb to the ferocity of a bear robbed of her whelps? God had driven Satan from heaven, and from his own presence, but left him at loose ends to prey upon his tender and innocent offspring, whom he had just left in a defenseless situation on this ball of earth. What would appear more unnatural and shocking, than for a father to chase his enemy out at the door, but leave him to slay his defenseless children in the street? I shall, after what I have observed, beg liberty to say, I am so far from believing any such story respecting the cause of sin, that have not even the shadow of evidence, from the scripture or from reason to support the sentiments. But I have been told, that man, standing in a state of sinless purity, could not have fallen from that rectitude, unless there had been some sinful being to have tempted him. Admitting there is any force in this observation, it stands as directly against the fall of Satan, without a tempter, as it does against man's transgression without a tempter. Was man more pure before he fell than that holy angel in heaven? If not, how could that angel sin without a temptation easier than man, who was made in a lower grade?
But supposing that we should admit that God commanded an angel to worship his son Jesus, and the angel refused, and call that the first sin ever committed, it would not determine its origin or cause. A cause or origin must exist before the effect or production. So, after all our journeying to heaven after a sinning angel and after pursuing him to hell and from hell to the earth, we have not yet answered the question,
"What is the origin of sin?"
We have shown that the way this question has been generally solved is without foundation.
Having stated what I have been told was the origin of sin, and giving my reasons why I do not believe it, I now come to give my own opinion of the matter.
Scripture, with the assistance of that reason (without which, the scripture would be of no more service to us than they are to the brute creation), I shall take for my guide, on the question before me. Almighty God is a being of infinite perfection. This the scripture will support, and reason will declare. He is the author of our existence, being the creator of the first man and woman, the occasion of them being formed of the dust of the ground, and the director of that providence by which we are all introduced by ordinary generations. Our Maker must have had a design in the works of his hands; this the scripture argues and reason says. The whole of Gods design must be carried into effect and nothing more admitting him to be an infinite being. It may assist us in arriving at a satisfactory solution of our subject, to consider in the first place, the origin of natural evil. This is unquestionably the necessary results of the physical organization and constitution of animal nature. In the elements of which our bodies are composed and in their combination in our constitution, we evidently discover ample provision for the production of all manner of disorder to which they are incident, and even of morality itself. A careful examination of our natural senses as mediums of pleasure and pain, and health and sickness, will very naturally lead to a consideration of these same sense as being the origin of sin, as far as we can see, of our thoughts and volitions. With these senses are necessarily connected all the various passions which we possess and which are ever in accordance with the ideas and thoughts by them created.
From the ever changing combination and various evolutions of these our senses, thoughts, ideas, appetites, and passions are found to originate all that variety of moral character which is found in man.
It has long been the opinion of Christian diviners that natural evil owes its origin to what is denominated moral evil or sin, but however respectable this sentiment may be considered on account of respectability of its advocates, we feel fully convinced that the very reverse of the opinion is true. The doctrine which we feel authorized to the reverse contends that natural evil is a judicial inflection on man for his sin, and therefore is the effect of moral evil; but the ground that we shall take is that natural evil owes its origin to the original constitution of our fleshly nature, and that moral evil, or sin, owes its origin to natural evil. In order to understand the truth of the position here taken, it is necessary only to notice, with due caution, the origin of our volitions. This in all cases is want. If man wanted nothing he would do nothing nor could he desire to do anything. Now want unsatisfied is an evil; and unsatisfied want is the first movement to action or violation. The motives which invites to action owes their strength to the nature and strength of desire which want creates, and the moral character of the actions depends on the character of the motive.
Thus man, as a partaker of flesh and blood, was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who subjected the same in hope, (Romans 8:20). This hope, which is that sure and steadfast anchor, which enters into that within the veil. And expectates in a life to come, is the title our creator has given us as heirs of that immortal and eternal life which are brought to light through the gospel. But from our natural constitution, composed of our bodily elements, we are led to act in obedience to our carnal appetite, which justifies the conclusion that sin is the work of the flesh, as expressed by Saint Paul in Galatians 5:19-21, "Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these: adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, Idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like: of the which I tell you before, as I have also told you in time past that they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God". Also read 1 Corinthians 3:3, For ye are yet carnal: for whereas there is among you envying, and strife, and divisions, are ye not carnal, and walk as men?"
If man had been wholly constituted of flesh and blood, both body and mind, so that he was no more susceptible of moral principles than the beast creation appears to be, then would he never have been capable of committing sin, or of enduring moral evil, any more than do the lower animals around us. We might have had the same natural appetites, desires, and passions which we now have, and might have strove, like all the other creatures to gratify them, and might have devoured one another all without committing sin, or feeling guilty, but we find in man what we may call a law of moral or spiritual life, of which Paul speaks in his letter to the Romans, where he is quite particular in setting forth the contrary working of the law of the flesh and the law of the Spirit of life, "For the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do. Now if I do that I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. I find then a law, that when I would do good, evil is present with me. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man: But I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of SIN WHICH IS IN MY MEMBERS," Rom. 7:19-23. There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit," 8:1, 2. These conflicting laws of the flesh and Spirit have always existed in man, from his first formation. So long as they both continue to exert their powers in opposition of each other, so long will sin remain and continue to produce condemnation. This law of the Spirit of Life is the Spirit of Christ, of which we read, "And so it is written, The first man Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was a quickening Spirit," 1 Corinthians 15:45. This we may say is the image of God in which man is created, as Christ is said to be the brightness of God's glory, and the expressed image of His person, Hebrews 1:3, "Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he had by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high."
By this accounting for the origin of sin we endeavor to set forth what we believe is the sense of the scripture representation of the subject. James says, "But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then when sin hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death," James 1:14, 15. In the forepart of Genesis the origin of sin is figuratively represented. There we are informed that man was placed in a garden of delight, to keep it and to dress it. The tree of life was in it, and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Man was bid welcome to the tree of life, but was forbidden the other. A subtle serpent comes to the woman, and tempts her with the forbidden fruit; she eats and gives to her husband, and he also partakes: Their eyes were opened to the knowledge of good and evil; they see that they are naked, and hide themselves from God; sewing fig leaves together for garments to hide their nakedness.
God comes into the garden in the cool of the day, calls for the man, and ask him if he had eaten of the forbidden fruit. He answers, that the woman whom God gave him gave unto him and he ate. The woman is next interrogated, and she lays it to the serpents guile. The ground is cursed for Adam's sake; and when he tills it, it is to produce briars and thorns. He is to eat his bread by the sweat of his face, and at last returns to the dust. The woman's conception was to be multiplied in sorrow, and her desire was to be to her husband, and he was to rule over her. The serpent was cursed above all cattle, was to go on his belly, and to eat dust as long as he lived. This is in short the scripture representation of the first sin, and I consider it to be figurative.
Should it be said that this garden was a literal garden, that the tree of life was a literal tree, and that the tree of knowledge of good and evil was also literal, I should be glad to be informed, what evidence can be adducted in support of such an idea. Where is the garden now? Where is the tree of knowledge of good and evil? Are those trees now growing on earth as literal trees?
We are not informed in the scripture that the garden has been carried off to heaven, or that either of the trees were transplanted there. It is written, that God drove the man whom he had made out of the garden, and placed cherubims and a flaming sword at the east of the garden, to keep the man from approaching the tree of life. If the garden was literal why could not Adam have gone into it on the north, south or west side? The pathway of understanding is now open and clear. God saw it fit in his divine plan of wisdom, to make the creature subject to vanity; to give him a moral constitution; to fix in his nature those faculties which would, in their operation, oppose the Spirit of the heavenly nature. It is therefore, said, that God put enmity between the seed of the woman and that of the serpent, and it was by the passion that arose from the fleshly nature, that the whole of the mind became carnal, and man was captivated thereby. "For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who hath subjected the same in hope, because the creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God," Romans 8:20. "And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shall bruise his heel," Genesis 3:15.
But perhaps the objector will say, this denies the liberty of the will, and makes God the author of sin. To which I reply, desiring the reader to recollect what I have said of sin in showing its nature; by which it is discovered, that God may be the innocent and holy cause of that which in a limited sense is sin; but as it respects the intentions of God, it is intended for good. It is not casting any disagreeable reflection on the Al- mighty, to say he determined all things for good; and to believe he superintends all of the affairs of the universe not excepting sin, is a million times more to the honor of God than to believe he cannot, or that he does not when he can. The reader will then ask, if God must be considered as the first, the holy and the innocent cause of sin, is there any unholy or impure causes? I answer, there is, but in a limited sense. There is no divine holiness in any fleshly or carnal exercise; there is no holiness nor purity in all the deceptions ever experienced by imperfect beings; and these are the immediate causes of sin; and as such, they make the best of men on earth groan and cry out, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Rom. 7:24. If it should be granted that sin will finally terminate for good, in the moral system, it will then be necessary to admit that God is its first cause, or we cannot say that God is the author of all good. If we say that sin is not for the good of God's system, but is a damage, we must also say that God would have prevented its taking place if it had been in his power; if it were not in his power, he is not omnipotent; neither can we say he is Supreme in an unlimited sense, as he was not superior to the cause which produced sin. But to say God is the author of sin, says the reader, sounds very badly, let you put what coloring you please upon it; and if I believe it I shall not dare to say it." Well, what shall I say in order to please? Say the devil was the author of sin. But is the devil a self existing one? Or did he make himself? "No; God made him to be a holy angel, and he made himself into a devil, by transgressing." Well, God made an angel, and the angel made a devil of himself, or anything else, proves that God was the first cause as much as anything I have argued. The objector will further say, that the angel was made a moral agent, and therefore ought to be considered the author of his own sin. But I say in reply, that if God produced an agency with the foreknowledge that the agency in question would produce sin, it argues that God is the first cause, and the agency the second and effective cause. If this mode of reason be faulted, I ask, is God not the origin and cause of moral righteousness? None can be perverse enough to say no; then I ask again, If the moral agency created by God, be not the original cause of moral transgression, by what rule of reasoning can it be made the original cause of righteousness? But I have before refuted the notion about this sinning angel. I now call the attention of the reader to man, which is our proper study; and attend the objection as it respects the liberty of the will. But in the first place, for the sake of the argument, I will consent any liberty of the will which is contended for, and then ask, what was the cause of man's having liberty of will? My opponent must allow it was God. Well, if the omniscient Father produced a liberty of will in man, and that liberty of will produced sin, is there any great difficulty in seeing that that is making God the original cause of sin in every sense that I have argued it?
What would the objector wish us to understand as the meaning of the term `will'? If it be any more or less than choice, I am at a loss about it. If it be choice, then what we have to look into is the liberty of choice. In order for choice to take place, the mind must have perceptions of two or more objects; and that object which has the most influence on the judgment and passions, will become the chosen object; and choice, in this instance, has not even the shadow of liberty. None will be vain enough to say that will, or choice, has any liberty before it exist. And choice does not exist until an object is chosen; And to say choice has liberty to refuse an object after it is chosen, is using violence on terms. And the same will be the conclusion if we take the word `will.' A person is invited by two friends, to make them a visit in the same afternoon, at their respective houses; he wishes to visit both, but cannot at the same time. In this circumstances, honored with both their invitations, he feels at a real loss what answer to make; both insist on compliance, with equal earnestness, and with equal influence on his judgment and passion, he is left without decisions. To end the affair, one of his friends says, I will go with you, this afternoon, and visit our friend. If you and he will return the visit next week. This presentation decides in the mind of him who was first invited, as the other consents to the proposal. Now, choice, or will is in favor of visiting, according to the last proposal made. Until the man willed to go, the will to go did not exist; it could have no liberty before it did exist. And after it did, to say, that that will which was to go one way was at liberty to go the other, is using the violence before mentioned. It is then evident that will, or choice, has no possible liberty. The objector will now move his position, and says it is the mind that has this liberty to choose or not to choose, or to will, or not to will. In order to determine this matter justly, I first ask, does the power of choosing exist in the mind, or in the object chosen? If it be answered that the power of choice is in the mind, and not in the object that influence the mind, the man who was at a lost to determine which of his friends to visit, while the object was in equal force on his mind, was entirely ignorant of it; and admitting it was so, it might as well have been otherwise, for the power of choosing in his mind did him no good; he was, after all, dependent on a certain circumstance, which, being attached to one object, made it preferable to the other. Again admitting the power of choice to be attributed to the mind, and not to the object which gives perception to the mind and influences it, it must be as easy for the mind to choose a minor, as a major object. It will be granted on all sides, that persons may choose an object in preference to another, which is not half so valuable; but this is always in consequence of error in judgment. Now it is as objects appear to the mind, that we ought to consider them in our present query. Supposing a poor man, who has a wife and some hungry children to feed, is afforded a dollar or a guinea for a days work. He does not know the value of either, not being acquainted with money, or its value, or the nature of the metals which are stamped with value. He consults, or means to consult the good of those for whom he is willing to labor, and would, if possible, receive that which would do the most good towards removing their wants. And says to himself, the dollar is much the largest, and the probability is, it is worth three times as much as the guinea. And at last he is convinced that this is the case. Now, I ask you, in relation to my argument, which one of those pieces of money would he be most likely to choose? The answer is the dollar. But I ask why? If his mind be at real liberty it is no more attached to the dollar than to the guinea; the influence which the dollar has on his mind more than the guinea destroys not the liberty of the mind to choose the guinea, I wish to be told why he is more likely to choose the dollar instead of the guinea? Or to alter the statement, so that the mind is not deceived. The man perfectly knows the value of both the pieces of money; the good of his wanting family is what he wishes to consult, which of these would he most likely choose in this case? Answer, the guinea. Why? Is there any reason, or is there not? There is, and it is the greater value; therefore the objects governs the choice. I ask, in the above instances, had the mind any power or liberty to choose the object which appeared to be of the least value, and refuse that which appeared the greatest? I am sure there is not a person in the world who would say that it had. Again, admitting, for the sake of argument, that the mind possesses this imaginary liberty; I then ask, how come it possessed such liberty? Answer, God gave it. Then the matter stands thus, God produced a mind, and give it liberty to will, or choose, and it wills or chooses. I ask what is the original cause of this willing and choosing? The reader will easily see, that if I grant my opponents argument, it will not be to his advantage. Again for the last time, if God give to man a liberty whereby he can choose or refuse the same object, did he not give his creature a liberty which he did not, himself, possess? Did not the Infinitely Wise eternally know all he himself would do? It must be granted that he did. Then I ask again does he possess any liberty in his nature, where by it is in his power to abandon the general system contained in his divine omnisciency and embrace one entirely different? I am sure there is but few in the world who would but say, as did the apostle, "He cannot deny himself." If the reader possesses any ability which is not in his Creator, I would ask, first, where he got it? And, secondly, if the Almighty knew all the consequences, that would arise from such an ability? If the answer be in the negative, it argues that his wisdom is finite and limited, and that he does not know, but this unaccountable ability of willing and choosing may finally destroy his whole plan in creation, providence, and redemption! If it be granted that he did know all the consequences that would arise from this ability of willing and choosing, which is called liberty of will, it is denying its existence. For if those consequences are all known, it argues they were all certain, and therefore, unavoidable.
Having, as I hope, to the readers satisfaction answered the objections in respect to the liberty of will, I would again invite him back to our subject.
The immediate causes of sin are found in our natural constitutions, and the most distant of the immediate causes are the same as the most distant of the immediate causes of our virtue; but the most immediate cause of our virtues and our vices are extremely different. For instance, two men meet at an inn; both of them have families which are in want of food; they have each fifty cents, which they have just taken for their day's work. One says, to the other, come, sit down, and we will take some drink for our comfort after a hard day's labor. The other reflects in his mind, and says to himself, to let my children suffer, at home, to gratify my company in what is indifferent to me, would be abominable, having no particular appetite for liquor; he, therefore refuses, bids his company good night, goes to buy the necessary provisions for his family, and goes home. He has done as a virtuous, honest husband should do. The other possesses a violent appetite for liquor; the moment he comes where it is his want over powers his love and duty to his family, the latter object being at a distance, and the former being nigh; he calls for drink until he spends his fifty cents, and then goes home to his expecting family intoxicated. In this, according to the scriptures, though he were a professed Christian, he is worse than an infidel.
In the mirror presented, the reader may see, that these two men acted equally alike from their natural wants, appetites and passions. Had either of them any wants, appetites or passions, neither of them would have done any thing at all. They would not have labored for the money; and if they had the money, they would not have laid it out in any way possible. Therefore, we see, that want, appetite and passion, in one, produced virtue, and in the other vice. But the still more immediate causes were not the same in both persons; and the consequences to them, in a moral sense, differ as much, as did the most immediate circumstances which produces their conduct. One felt the approbation of a good conscience in having done what cool, dispassionate reason dictated; the other, as soon as his eyes is opened to see what he has done, is struck with condemnation for having violated the dictates of that law of prudence and equity; of which he was susceptible.
A beggar, influenced by hunger, calls at the door of the affluent, for food; he knows it is there; his appetite is good; the object magnifies to his senses; but by one who knows the love of property more than the want of food, he is sternly denied. The beggar prostrates himself and moves his suit in language of distress, reducing his petition to only a piece of bread; The covetous man is a little moved, with some small feeling of compassion, but fearing if he should bestow, he should, in consequence, be troubled again, bids the beggar to depart and leave him. The beggar's object was food, his passion was hunger; he acted up to the influence of his object, and did all in his power to obtain it. The others object was the saving of his property, and his passion was covetousness; he acted up to the influence of his object, to the gratification of his passion. Now, had the circumstances been varied so much as this, that he did not think his giving, at that time, would ever induce the beggar to call again, the probability is, his object and his passion would have both been different; to feed a hungry man, would have been his object and charity his passion.
Man's main object, in all he does, is happiness; and were it not for that, he never could have any other particular object. What would induce men to form societies; to be at the expense of supporting government; to acquire knowledge; to learn the science, or till the earth, if they believed that they could be as happy without as with? The fact is, man would not be the being that he now is, as there would not be any stimulus to action; he must become inert, therefore cease to be. As men are never without this grand object, so they are never without their wants which renders such an object desirable. But their minor objects vary, according as their understanding vary, and their passions differ.