We will now state two particulars which the reader will find argued in the course of this work, state our opponents objections against them, answer those objections, and introduce our second general inquiry by stating a third objection.

1st. Man is dependent in all his volitions and moves by necessity.

2nd The Almighty has a good intention in every volition of man.

Objection first. If man moves by necessity, why do the scriptures abound with exhortations and admonitions to dissuade from sin and so many inducements to persuade to holiness and virtue? And why are there requirements in the law, to which man is under the necessity of going contrary?

Objection second. If God has a good intention in every action of volition of man, why is it said in the scriptures that he is grieved and provoked with us?

The proposition against which the first objection stands, answers the objections in all its parts. It was in the system of divine wisdom, that man should experience a consciousness of sin and guilt without which the subject of my inquiry could never have existed. If sin and guilt had never been introduced into our system the plan of grace by atonement could never have existed, providing there had been no prohibition communicated to the intelligent mind; and on the other hand, if the mind possessed as much liberty to go contrary to inducements, as it does inclinations to follow them inducements would have no possible effects, exhortations, admonitions, and warrings would be of no possible service.

If God purposed that man should come to the knowledge of his own infirmities in the way that he does he must have intended all the means whereby the purpose might be accomplished. And if he designed that any degree of moral holiness should be found on earth , such inducements must influence the minds of men, which would necessarily produce it. That God does in a strict sense of speaking, require more of any of his creatures than they are able to perform is inconsistent with dictates of good reason, and destitute of scripture authority; and has no better foundation for its support than an idea that darkness originates in the sun, or light in an opaque body. But does not God require perfect holiness of man? Does he not command strict obedience to every jot and tittle of his law?

We have before argued that the Spirit of God's law, in its infinite fullness, was above the capacity of man in a finite state, in which he was made subject to vanity; and that it was a limited knowledge of the law only that was introduced to the creature's understanding, and that for the purpose, that the offense might abound. Then says our opponent, if you are correct in this statement does it not prove that the requirements is more than the abilities of the creature can perform? And how can the difficulty be removed?

The proper answer to this question is derived from a due recurrence to the original constitution of man. If we believe that man, as a moral being, was constituted to occupy this moral state only and that his whole existence is limited to this state, then must we conclude that in this mortal state when we find health and sickness, pleasure and pain, virtue and vice, happiness and misery, the law of moral rectitude, being obeyed so far as to correspond with the law of physical organization, which is productive of the natural health of the body, it answers the full extent of its purpose and is as fully obeyed as a creator designed it ever should be. It is evident that the design of the Creator in the laws of corporeal, or animal nature embraces not only all the health and pleasure which corporeal beings enjoy; but also all the sickness and pain they endure. So likewise, in constitution of man, as a moral being, the law of moral rectitude was designed to administer not only those moral enjoyments, which are far the sweetest felicities with which we are blessed, but also those pungent compunctions of conscience which are our bitterest sufferings. If therefore we extend our views no farther than man's earthly state, we view it perfectly philosophical to conclude that it was no more the design of the Creator that man should here enjoy perfect righteousness, free from the alloys of gilt, than it was that he should here enjoy uninterrupted health and ease of body.

But in agreement with our view before expressed concerning man's original constitution as a moral being, in which he was made subject to vanity, we embrace the doctrine of future immortal life, in which state man will be as free from sin and condemnation as that immortality state will be free from sickness, corruption and death. We, according to their views, look for present obedience to the divine law in that glorious constitution manifested in Christ, who hath abolished death and brought life and immortality to light through the gospel, and who is said to be, the Lord our righteousness.

We come to take notice of the second objection. There are many passages of scripture which represent the Almighty as possessing irritable passions like his creatures. We are told that it repented him that he had made man on the earth and that it grieved him at his heart. These expressions are strong in their indication of changeability, as any that might be chosen. An apostle exhorts not to grieve the Holy Spirit; and it is not infrequent that God provoked to anger and jealousy, according to scripture.

Our opponent will not argue that we ought to understand those scriptures as strictly and literally true: no man in his senses can believe them so, and yet believe the Almighty to be unchangeable. Supposing our opponents should give their own opinion of this question; we have no doubt but that it would remove the objection to all intents. We understand those scriptures, as many others do, to be spoken according to the dark understanding of man, who is ignorant of the real character of God; and according to the representation made by the law to unreconciled minds. To admit, in a strict sense of speaking, that God was ever grieved to the heart for what he did himself, or for what his creatures do, is more than we can do and believe in his perfection. Saint James says. With God there is no variability, or shadow of turning. This expression is as strong and indication of the unchangeability of the Almighty, as any that might be chosen. Saint Paul informs us that God works all things after the council of his own will. Our being led by a carnal and fleshly mind, is undoubtedly what the Apostle meant, by grieving the Holy Spirit; as the motions or volitions of the carnal man are opposed of those of the heavenly; but that the eternal Spirit of God ever felt grief is more than we can rationally admit, as that would reduce the Almighty to a state of suffering. It is very evident, that the scripture represents the Almighty in extremely different characters; and we confess we cannot reconcile them in any other way, than by two covenants, or what is the same, flesh and Spirit. Our ideas of God, while under the legal dispensation, walking in the fleshly mind are consonant to that character which the scripture represents our Creator in, as wrathful, filled with indignation toward us for our sins, and every day angry. Those ideas which the mind entertains of the Father of all mercies when enlightened by the Spirit of life of the New Man, and while walking in the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus, which makes us free from the law of sin, are altogether consonant to that endearing character given in the scripture, of our Father who is in heaven, who causes his sun to shine on the evil and on the good; and sendeth rain upon the just and upon the unjust; who loved us while we were yet sinners, and sent his son to die, in attestation of his love to his creatures; who is good unto all, and whose tender mercies are over all his works; who is of one mind, and changeth not.

Says our opponent, if the Almighty govern all the affairs of mankind, according to his own appointment; if he were never disapointed; suffered no violation of will; but does, in all things, and by all things, maintain and support his own eternal system of divine goodness, what room do we find for the necessity of atonement, whereby peace is made by the blood of the cross? By this question we come to our second general subject,

Atonement For Sin?

In our inquiries on this momentous subject, we shall first examine three doctrinal tenets on atonement; from which, we shall beg leave to dissent, and give our reason thereof.

Secondly, show the necessity of atonement, and show where satisfaction must be made.

Thirdly, inquire into the personage and character of the mediator, who makes the atonement, and his ability to perform the work.

Fourthly, of the atonement in its nature. Christians divines, in general, have agreed in supposing sin to be an infinite evil, being a violation of an infinite law, and therefore, that the law requires an infinite sacrifice; short of which no atonement could be made; that the transgression of Adam brought the whole human race into the same situation of sin and misery, and subjected them all to the infinite penalty of an infinite law, which they had violated in their parents, before they individually existed.

After the above agreement many different roads are taken; and divines of the greatest abilities, and of the first rank among the literates, have drained the last faculty of invention, in plodding through the dark regions of metaphysics, to bring up a Samuel to explain the solecism of satisfying an infinite dissatisfaction.

The plan of redemption, as held by many, may be reduced to the following compendium: God, from all eternity, foreseeing that man would sin, provided a mediator for a certain part of his posterity, who should suffer the penalty of the law for them, and these elect ones, chosen by God from the rest of mankind, will alone be benefited by the atonement; that, in order that the sacrifice might be adequate to the crime, for which, the sinner was condemned to everlasting, or endless suffering, God Himself, assumed a body of flesh and blood, such as the delinquent was constituted in and suffered the penalty of the law by death and arose from the dead. By this process the demand of the law was completely answered, and the debt due divine justice, by the elect, was fully and amply paid. But that this atonement does not effect those that were not elected as objects of mercy, but that they are left to suffer endlessly for what Adam did, before they were born. It is true they are cautious about saying, that God himself absolutely died! But they say, Christ, who was crucified, was really God himself, which must in effect, amount to the same thing. And in fact, if an infinite being did not suffer death the whole plan falls, for it is by an infinite sacrifice that they pretend to satisfy an infinite dissatisfaction.

Why the above idea should ever have been imbibed of men of understanding and study, we can, but scarcely satisfy ourselves; their absurdities are so glaring, that it seems next to impossible, that men of sobriety and sound judgment should ever imbibe them, or avoid seeing them.

We have already sufficiently refuted the idea of an infinite sin, which opens to a plain path, in which the mind may run, and run clear of all these perplexities which have served to confuse, rather than enlighten mankind.

If sin be not infinite, the dissatisfaction occasioned by sin is not infinite. Therefore an infinite sacrifice is not required, but for the sake of illustration, we will for a moment admit, that the doctrine of atonement stands on the ground over where we have just gone. We will state it as it is often stated by those who believe it, which is by the likeness of debt and credit, which he was unable to discharge. The Divine being cannot consistently honor, dispense with the pay, but says, I must have what is my due; but as the debtor has not the ability to pay the smallest fraction, Divine Wisdom lays a deep concerted mysterious plan for the debt to be discharged, and how was it? Why, for God to pay it himself!

Our neighbor owes us a hundred pounds, time of payment comes, and we make a demand for our dues. Says our neighbor, my misfortunes have been such that I am not the possessor of the smallest fraction of property in the world; and as much as I owe you I am worse than nothing. I declare to him positively that I will loose not so much as a fraction of the interest, and leave him. A friend calls, and ask me how I succeeded in obtaining my dues of my neighbor; I reply, My neighbor is not, nor will he ever be able to pay me any part of my demand. My friend says, he is sorry that I should loose my debt. I answer, I shall not loose it. I have very fortunately, in my meditation on the subject, thought of a method, by which I can avail myself of the whole, to my fullest satisfaction; and I think it is a method that no person in the world, but myself, could ever have discovered. My friend is curious, and impatient to know the secret, never before found out. The reader may guess his confusion, on my telling him, that, as I have that sum already by me, I am now going to pay up the obligation, before the interest is any larger! This has been called the Gospel plan, which contains the depths of infinite wisdom.

We should be pleased to see, what we have never seen: professors follow such example in obtaining what the poor widow, the fatherless, and the needy, owe them. But says the advocate for the plan, a distinction ought to be made between the persons in the Godhead, who paid this infinite debt to the first; therefore, it is not altogether like a person paying his own demand. We say, in answer, if the first and second person in the Godhead are not so essentially one, as to make the debts due to one belong to the other, and payment also, they are not essentially one, as to be represented by two distinct persons related only by Adam, who are co- in merchandise. But for the sake of carrying the argument still further, we will admit this variety of persons in an infinite indivisible being! And also the plan of atonement on the principle of the second person's paying the demand to the first, and here it will be necessary to introduce the third person in the Godhead, as it is contended that the third person makes known to the debtor, what the creditor determines concerning him.

Then the plan of the doctrine may be represented by the following similitude: A owes B the sum of one thousand pounds; the time of the payment comes, demand is made; A is not worth a farthling, neither is it in his power to raise a fraction of the money. B immediately commences a process against A, of which C, a friend of A's being informed goes to B, ask him how large a demand he holds against A; B informed him, a thousand pounds and the interest. And is A worth nothing? ask C. Nothing, answers B. Would you make a deduction of twenty-five percent if you could have the money down? ask C. Not the least deduction, answers B. You will at least throw in the interest, says C. Not the smallest fraction, answers B. Well, says C, if you have no mercy on the poor and distressed, I will have the pleasure of relieving the debtor alone; counts out the money in full, and receives the obligation to bestow on his friend, A. B sends a servant immediately, to inform A, that he has concluded to forgive him the debt. A is transported at the news, flies to tell his wife, and children, the tidings of mercy, and all join in praising such heavenly benevolence. C comes in, the same moment, with the obligation in his hand; modestly gives it to A, desiring him to accept it as a token of sincere friendship. A is confounded, and ask C, how he came by the obligation; C informs him, that he paid every farthing of the money for it, the creditor would not make the least deduction. We have the reader to judge, where the creditor showed any mercy to the debtor, and whether B's pretension of favoring A, do not wear the appearance of hypocrisy. It is contended by those that hold to his debt, and the payment of it, that the salvation of the sinner is by being forgiven; yet they contend, that the debt is paid, But how he can forgive a man a debt and oblige him to pay it, is more than we can see.

Again admitting the system true, we wish to inquire into the propriety of an innocent person's suffering for one who is guilty. It is scripture reason and good law, never to condemn the innocent in order to exculpate the delinquent. Supposing a foreign court sends a person, who is old in conspiracies of blood, to America, to lay a deep concerted plan to murder the President of the Union, and a number of the first officers in the federal government; and he should so far succeed, as to engage a number in his wicked design, and finally makes the attempt; his plans are discovered by the government, and deterred, but not until numbers have fallen a sacrifice to his mischievous endeavors. The leader of these seditious murderers, is taken and condemned to be executed; and the voice of every friend of justice and equity is against the criminal, but what would be the consternation of the good people of the United States, on being informed, that the good President of the Union, the man in whom the people delighted to honor, was executed in the room of the seditious person, and the wicked murderer set at liberty? Is it impossible to conceive that there is a single person in the world, who would call this a just execution? If it is said that the president freely offered himself in the room of the criminal, it alters not the case, in the eyes of justice. If an innocent man can justly be put to death, because he consents to it willingly, a guilty man may be acquitted because he prefers it. But it is further agreed that the authority had the power to raise the president from the dead, which done, renders the work just and glorious. We say, in answer, that if the authority had this power, it might as well have executed the real criminal, and raised him from the dead, as to performed this work on one who was not guilty. What is the most shocking of anything, in this system of atonement, is, the partiality represented in the Almighty; for admitting the plan rational, as it respects those circumstances, in which we have shown its absurdity, what can we find in scripture, or reason, that justifies such infinite partiality in our Creator? Or can in the least, serve as evidence to prove him possessed of it. Have we not reason to believe our Creator possessed of as much goodness as he has communicated to us? Can we rationally believe, that he is wanting in those principles of goodness which he has placed in our understanding. When he saw the whole progeny of Adam in the same situation, by reason of sin, no one more guilty than another, why should he purpose a plan of mercy for some few of them, and disregard the awful circumstances of the rest? The sacred oracle declares God to be no respector of person; if this be true, he is not a partial being. Jesus taught the character of God to his disciples, by turning their attention to nature, observing the equal distribution of rain and sunshine, on the evil and on the good, on the just and on the unjust. Supposing Joseph had dealt out bread plentiful to two of his brethren in Egypt, and had starved the rest to death, would it have looked like impartiality? It is argued, that none of them deserved a crumb from Joseph, whom they had sold; and if he pleased to give to one, and not to another, he had a right to do so. Then we say, he had a right to be partial.

We are traveling through a large and extensive woods, and many miles from any inhabitants; we find ten persons who are lost; they have been out of provision for several days; and having fatigued themselves, in wondering from hill to hill, from stream to stream, striving, to the utmost of their ability to find inhabitants; having give up all hope of ever seeing their homes again, and having, in their minds, bid their wives and children a long farewell, they are waiting for hunger to do its last work! The moment we discover ourselves to them, with large supplies of wholesome and rich provisions, every eye glistens with unexpected joy; the current of life starts afresh in their veins, and they all advance to meet us on their enfeebled hands and knees, with eagerness to receive the staff of life! We has- ten to improve the opportunity of showing our sovereignty and goodness; we feed five of them to full, the other five, we neglect. They beg for the smallest crust, which we do not want, but to no effect. Those whom we feed solicit us, every mouthful they eat, to bestow some on their fellow sufferers, but we refuse. We tell them, however, not to construe our conduct into partiality, but to learn our power and sovereignty by it. The five whom we have fed, we assist out of the woods, and leave the rest to their wants!

We inquire still further, did the Almighty know before he made man, that he would become a sinner? Did he know he would deserve an endless punishment? If the answer be in the negative, it supposes God to be wanting in knowledge, and that he created beings at an infinite risk, as he did not know what would be the consequences. If the answer be in the positive, it proves an infinite cruelty existed in God; for unless that was the case, he would never have created beings, who he knew would be infinitely the losers by their existence.

Those who believe in the system which we are explaining, believe in the existence of the devil, who's existence we have refuted in this work. We are willing, however for the sake of the argument, to admit the existence of their God, and the devil likewise. But wish to inquire, which of them is, in reality, the worst being. God when he created mankind, perfectly knew that some of them would suffer endless torment, for their sins; he must, therefore, have intended them for that purpose. For it is inconsistent to suppose, that the Almighty would create without a purpose; and his purpose could not be contrary to his knowledge. The matter then stands thus, God created millions of beings for endless misery which they could not escape; the devil is desirous of having them miserable and does all in his power to effect it. Now reader, Judge between these, had the devil been consulted, by the Almighty, when he laid the plan of man's final destiny, we cannot conceive him capable of inventing one more eligible to his infernal disposition, than this which we are now disputing.

As reason will not consent to the plan of God, as described in the foregoing scheme, we will show that the scripture equally oppose it. It is granted, that Jesus Christ died for mankind, as the scripture declare; but not in the way, in which millions have believed. But supposing he died instead of the sinner, in the way which we dispute, we still wish to prove, that he died for the whole of Adam's posterity as much as he did for any.

If Isaiah did not believe that that would be the case, we can not reconcile his words to his opinion which we find in chapter 53:5, 6, "But he was wounded for our transgression, he was bruised for our iniquities; the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed. All we, like sheep, have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way; and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all." Saint Paul must have been of this opinion, when he wrote to Timothy, or his words are not expressive of his belief. "For there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus; who gave himself a ransom for all, to be testified in due time," 1 Timothy 2:5, 6, "My little children, these things write I unto you, that ye sin not, and if any man sin we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous; and he is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world," 1 John 2:1, 2. "But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels, for the suffering of death, now crowned with glory and honor; that he, by the grace of God, should taste death for every man," Hebrews 2:9.

The above scriptures, with their connection and corresponding passages, as fully prove that Christ died for all men, as any one thing can be proved from the Bible. Now, as there is not, in all the scriptures, a single hint to the reverse of these passages which we have introduced, it appears strange and unaccountable to me that any person, who professed to believe in the testimony of the Bible, should ever have entertained the idea, that what these passages say, is false, and that which is not said, in contradiction to what is, is true! Look, You readers, and submit to astonishment, at what has been believed in, as divine truth. An Almighty, infinite, wise and good being, creates an innumerable multitude of rational intelligences; they rebel against him, and raise an infinite dissatisfaction in his mind toward them; this infinite dissatisfaction gets removed toward part of the offenders, by the sacrifice of innocence; With the rest God is still displeased; yet, he is Almighty, and infinitely wise and employs his power and wisdom to make the works of his own hand as miserable as their nature will bear for being just such creatures as he knew they would be, before he made them. But it is argued, that God knowing what sort of creature men would be, did not influence them in the smallest degree, to be what they are. Let this argument be granted. But did not God know what would influence men to be what they are? Answer, Yes! Was it in his power to remove this influential cause? If it were why did he not do it, if it were likely to displease him? If it were not in his power to prevent the mischief, we wish to know whether it were in the creature's power to prevent it? If it were not in the power of either of them to prevent the operation of things in the way in which they have, and do take place, Why is God's anger so hot against his poor impotent offsprings? It seems an unhappy circumstance, for both the Creator and the creatures. The Creator is not happy with his creatures; his creatures finds themselves introduced into an existence infinitely worse than none. We are born into this world of sorrow and trouble; the first vibrations of senses is want; we endeavor to supply our wants, and to maintain our existence, which our maker has bestowed upon us; but as soon as we come to years of understanding, we are told of an infinite debt which stands against us, which we owed thousands of years before we were born; and that our maker is so angry with us, and has been every since the debt was due, that he has pre- pared a furnace of endless flames to torment us in, according to the requirements of justice! My father gives me his farm, and puts me in possession of it; I am pleased and prize it very highly. In consequences of my possession, I paint to myself many pleasing prospects; but to my mortification, a person comes and presents me with a mortgage of my farm, for five times its value, the mortgage running so as to hold the possessor to clear it; I will leave it to the reader to say, whether my father was kind or unkind. Yet the circumstances into which the Almighty has introduced millions of his creatures, is infinitely worse according to the doctrine which we are examining. It is argued, with much assurance, that God has a just right to do with his creatures as he pleases, because he has it in his power so to do; but what he does, is right, because he does it.

If the above statement be just, moral holiness consist in power of action, and not in the disposition that designs the action. If so, our argument in favor of sin's existing only in the design of the actor, and not in the action, is groundless; and we are driven to say, that unholiness, or sin, is the want of power to perform an action; and holiness consist in having the power to do it. One man designs to murder another for his money, he makes the attempt, and fails; his sin consisted in not having the power to execute his design; but in the design there is no evil. On the other hand, he makes the attempt, and succeeds; here is no evil at all, because he had power to do it. On this principle, every thing that can be done is moral holiness; and everything that cannot be done, is sin, or moral evil.

Here we are presented with a picture the most to be dreaded, of anything which the imagination of man is capable of inventing. Power moving on in front, exhibiting tyrannic majesty in every action; and meager justice in the rear, obsequiously pronouncing all right! If these things be so, our senses are nothing but mediums of deception; and all our experiences has served us no other purpose than to make us more ignorant. Who is there in the world, possessing common sense, that does not dread, and revolt from power, in every instance where they see it connected with an evil disposition? Are we right in wishing our enemies weak? We are, and that because their strength being directed by their wicked design, gives us fear.

But for the sake of argument, still further, let it  be granted, that God being supreme, had a right to do, because he had the power. And he created millions of beings, whom he intends for endless torment, and puts his whole design into execution; and this is called supreme goodness. Now we wish to know how a supreme evil could be describe?  All will grant, that evil is in opposition to good; then an opposite description would be just. To create,  with an intention to make eternally happy, and to put that design into execution, would be supreme evil!   But according to the doctrine which we are examining God contains these two characters in himself, having created some for one purpose, and some for the other. It will be of no advantage to the reader to have the absurdity of the above proposition any more exposed, than enough to have it rejected.   We never heard or read any argument to prove the propriety of the disputed proposition. It is a begged proposition and stands without the least shadow of evidence from scripture  or reason,  but it requires no great ingenuity to see what the chimera was invented for; without it, the whole plan and scheme of atonement,  which we are now examining, would fall,  for want of foundation.